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MASS MEDIA’S CULTIVATION EFFECT ON ISLAMIC, MUSLIM,  
AND QUR’ANIC PREJUDICE 
 
 
Shanna J. Carlson 
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This thesis explores the power of the mass media’s ability to cultivate reality in terms of 
the threat of Islam. A rhetorical analysis of the messages portrayed by the mass media is then  
compared to the findings of the study. While the study did not find any significant correlation  
between consumption of media and fear of Muslims, the Qur’an, or Islam, it did find a strong  
negative correlation between intergroup contact and salience of stereotypes. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Muslims and Middle Easterners have constituted the West’s and Christianity’s number 
one nemesis for close to ten centuries.  A diverse and large area of the world has been reduced to 
a single identity: the barbaric, hate-driven Muslim Arab.  Shaheen (2003) explains that the term 
“Arab” is used to “refer to the 265 million people who reside in and the many more millions 
around the world who are from the 22 Arab states” (p. 173).  The Muslim population has surged 
to 1.6 billion and is considered “the fastest growing religion…[and]…if current demographic 
trends continue, the number of Muslims is expected to exceed the number of Christians by the 
end of this century” (Lipka, 2016, “How many Muslims,” para. 1).  Lipka explains that the 
majority of the world’s Muslim population is not centered in the Middle East or Northern Africa.  
Indonesia is currently the home to the largest concentration of Muslims, but India is expected to 
replace Indonesia by 2050 with a projected Muslim population of 300 million (Lipka, 2015).  
This dispersion of Islam is being fueled by global climate change and violent wars raging across 
the East.   
Muslims and non-Muslims are interacting more and more frequently.  The growing 
global climate and immigration trends are only going to increase interaction between the groups.  
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2016) explains that since 
January 1, 2016, the numbers of refugees from Northern Africa and the Middle East are steadily 
increasing.  Some of these refugees may be due to climate change. Frangoul (2016) reports that a 
German study predicted that “by the middle of the century temperatures in these areas [Middle 
East and North Africa] would not drop lower than 30 degrees Celsius at night during the warmest 
periods, with temperatures potentially hitting 46 degrees Celsius during the day” (para 6); 
climate change anticipates migration out of these areas to cooler climates.  However, the 
2 
 
UNHCR reports that “the vast majority of those attempting this dangerous crossing are in need 
of international protection, fleeing war, violence, and persecution in their country of origin” (np).  
The growing Muslim population around the world and the forced increased interaction among 
cultures highlights the need to explore the media’s ability to cultivate and maintain a fear of an 
entire religion and region of the world.   
Al Dawlah al-Islameyah fi Iraq wal-Sham (daesh), which translates into the Islamic State 
in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), is carrying out bombings around the world, security lines at airports 
are growing longer, fear of the next terror attack is high, and the media are capitalizing on these 
situations.  Mass media outlets are constantly reporting on the latest bombing or feared threat all 
over the world.  Islamophobia has become so pervasive that anything can cause a scare if it is 
seen as being Arab, Islamic, or daesh.  Agence France-Presse (2015) reports that a global charity 
group, The Bearded Villains, were reported to Swedish police as suspected daesh members.  In 
an interview with Agence France-Presse, the group’s spokesman, Andre Fransson, said that he 
acknowledges “that the club’s flag – two crossed sabers on a black background – could easily be 
confused with that of the militant group” (para. 5).  While it may be true that the club’s flag does 
resemble daesh’s, that is not grounds for the need for a police presence.  The men are part of an 
international organization that does charity work around the world, yet they suffer at the hands of 
Islamophobia simply for the colors on their flag.   
Europe is witnessing a vast influx of Middle Eastern and Muslim refugees due to the 
conflicts in Syria and Iraq.  Hjelmgaard (2016) explains that anti-immigration/anti-Muslim 
groups and demonstrations are quickly growing.  “Germany’s Patriotic Europeans Against the 
Islamization of the Occident, or PEGIDA” (para. 2) held a demonstration in Dresden that drew 
thousands of participants.  PEGIDA, and other groups across Europe, have organized multiple 
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demonstrations denouncing the acceptance of Muslim refugees.  The protests are not always 
peaceful either; Hjelmgaard states that “riot police clashed with protesters at several of the rallies 
including in Calais, France, where police used tear gas to disperse crowds” (para. 7).   
The United States has seen its share of rejection of Syrian refugees as well.  Fantz and 
Brumfield (2015) report that “states protesting the admission of refugees range from Alabama 
and Georgia, to Texas and Arizona, to Michigan and Illinois, to Main and New Hampshire.  
Among these 31 states, all but one have Republican governors” (para. 2).  The United States 
Federal Government has the final say on where refugees are sent; 31 states opposed any Syrian 
refugee because they feared all of the refugees would be members of daesh (Fantz & Brumfield).  
The 2016 Republican nominee, Donald Trump, has gone so far as to suggest a moratorium on all 
Muslim immigrants. Since this suggestion in early 2016, he and his Vice-Presidential candidate, 
Michael Pence, have changed the proposal to be all immigrants from regions with ties to 
terrorism against the United States and its allies, possibly including Christians and non-Muslim’s 
in their proposal (Parker, 2016).  The blatant threat construction regarding Islam and Muslims 
needs to be addressed. 
The mainstream stereotype that Muslims are daesh terrorists sneaking into America 
disguised as refugees is not the only discrimination Muslims and Arabs face.  The fear of another 
attack on the level of September 11, 2001, against the U.S. is very real for many.  Such fear 
resulted in the delay of an American Airlines flight when a female passenger accused an 
individual next to her of being a terrorist based on his writing (Guardian staff, 2016).  The 
Guardian reports that University of Pennsylvania economics professor Guido Menzio “was 
solving a differential equation, but said he was told the woman thought he might be a terrorist 
because of what he was writing” (para. 3).  While Menzio told The Guardian that he was treated 
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with the upmost respect from the FBI agents, his experience, and the experiences of others, 
highlight the lack of education regarding Islam, Muslims, and the Middle East.  False 
accusations regarding “Islamic terrorists” affect more people every day.   
Discrimination based on religion has compounded racial oppression for centuries.  
California high school student Bayan Zehlif unfortunately was a victim of this discrimination 
because she is dark skinned and wears a hijab.  Her high school yearbook identified her as “Isis 
Phillips,” and her school is claiming it is an honest mistake (Begley, 2016).  In response to her 
school’s attempted apology, Zehlif told Begley that the school had “the audacity to say this was a 
typo.  I beg to differ, let’s be real” (para. 2).  The school maintains that Zehlif was mistaken for a 
student at the school who is named Isis; nonetheless, Begley reports that many individuals have 
reacted on social media claiming the move was driven by Islamophobia and have called for 
Zehlif to take action.  Sadly, high school students are not the only ones that are targets of 
Islamophobia. 
Anyone that has dark skin and hair is at risk of being identified as a member of Al Qaeda, 
even Miss USA 2014, Nina Davuluri (Abad-Santos, 2013).  Following her crowning, Davuluri, 
who is an Indian-American, was subjected to numerous anti-Muslim outcries (Abad-Santos).  
Abad-Santos explains that “she was born in Syracuse” and lived her life in America (“Racism 
Fail,” para. 1).  Furthermore, “the part of India where Davuluri’s parents hail from, Andhra 
Pradesh, is not predominantly Muslim…it’s 88.8 percent Hindu.”  Individuals took to social 
media to lash out at Davuluri.  Many called her “an Al Qaeda plant” and went as far as linking 
her “coronation with 9/11, suggesting that the choice of a brown woman was in some way 
disrespectful and unpatriotic, given the fact that the pageant was held four days after the 12th 
anniversary of the attack on the World Trade Center” (Hafiz, 2013, np).  However, Miss USA 
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2010, Rima Fakih, was a Muslim.  She was also emigrated from Lebanon to Las Vegas 
(Sacirbey, 2010).  In an interview with Sacirbey, Fakih is open about her religion and being seen 
as an ambassador for other Muslims.  While she did receive some racial backlash when she won, 
the outcries were not as vehement as the ones endured by Davuluri.  Hafiz (2013) explains that 
“the authors of the anti-Muslim tweets appear to have forgotten that…the winner of the 2010 
Miss USA pageant, Rima Fakih, actually is [Muslim].  And the sky didn’t fall” (np). When and 
who is targeted by Islamophobia is uncertain, but what is certain is that Islamophobia is deeply 
engrained in individuals around the world. 
Villains exist in our movies, fictional stories, and news broadcasts.  Film adaptations of 
books and short stories often take cultural liberties in characterization and scene settings.  The 
iconic James Bond movies would change the nationality of the villains Fleming created or inflate 
the original threat in an effort to match real world political fears to Hollywood’s created reality.  
Bennett and Woollacot (1987) explain that “in the novel, Goldfinger’s aim is to seize the 
American gold reserves.  .  .  [but] in the film, Goldfinger’s conspiracy takes the form of a 
nuclear threat.  An atomic device, provided by Red China” (p. 155).    China had recently tested 
its first successful nuclear weapon and fear of a nuclear attack against the United States was high 
(Bennett & Woollacot).  While Fleming wrote for a different political situation than when the 
films were created, this did not stop Hollywood’s adaptation of his work to the current political 
atmosphere.  Black (2001) contends that “the difference in politics between the books and the 
films is true both of method and of content” (p. 92).  Contemporary mass media often rely on the 
Arab villain, such as Syriana, the television series Homeland, and many others.  Altering 
characters continues in the 21st century, this time with the villain being changed to Muslim 
and/or Arab.   
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More recently, comic books have been re-popularized and are being manipulated to fit 
current political conditions.  Iron Man and Iron Man 3 are two movies that uniquely target the 
“deplorable” Muslim terrorist.  In 2008 Iron Man graced the silver screen.  Full of action and 
new high-tech weapons, Tony Stark makes millions through his ever more powerful and efficient 
weapons of mass destruction used to fight the terrorists.  Tony Stark was captured by an Islamic 
group and only escapes through the aid of a Christian Arab who is also held captive.  Toward the 
end of the movie, Tony Stark retaliates against the cell by returning to the area he was held 
captive and bombing it with abandon, ensuring that every member of the terrorist cell is 
incinerated.  Iron Man 3’s main villain was named “Mandarin” and in the comics was depicted 
as a villain of Chinese descent; however, Marvel Studios Kevin Feige told Breznican (2012) that 
the production team decided “to blur the background” of the Mandarin for the film (para. 13).  
However, despite the team’s greatest efforts, the Mandarin was depicted primarily as a 
stereotypical Arab villain, complete with a “bin Laden-esque beard” and AK-47 kept at his side 
(para. 13).  Marvel Studios may have been trying to blur the character’s background, but instead 
their efforts resulted in just reframing the villain’s ethnicity to the most recent perceived 
international threat.   
The mass media have managed to silence Arabia and Islam’s contributions to the entire 
world. Arabic and Islamic contributions to society, especially Western society, go unappreciated. 
Leonardo di Vinci found his inspiration in Arab and Persian physicians and scientists, the 
concept of absolute zero and algebra was invented by Arabs, Western scholars were able to 
create an advanced educational system based on Arab intellectuals, and many English words 
have Arabic roots – “algebra, chemistry, coffee, and others” (Shaheen, 2003, p. 173). Shaheen 
also explicates how: 
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in astronomy, Arabs used astrolabes for navigation, star maps, celestial globes, and the 
concept of the center of gravity. In geography, they pioneered the use of latitude and 
longitude. They invented the water clock; their architecture inspired the Gothic style in 
Europe. In agriculture, they introduced oranges, dates, sugar, and cotton, and pioneered 
water works and irrigation. (p. 173) 
However, Americans are rarely, if ever, educated on these advancements. American students are 
taught that Newton discovered gravity, Galileo discovered that the earth was round, and that the 
Greeks and Romans pioneered agricultural irrigation. Attributing these discoveries to more 
Westernized individuals continues to cultivate the idea that nothing good has or will come out of 
Islam or the Middle East.   
Additionally, the Arab world has been known to aid the West in wars with itself. Shaheen 
(2003) illustrates how “Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian soldiers…fought alongside French 
troops in North Africa, Italy, and France. Also, Jordanian and Libyan troops assisted members of 
the British armed services. And, late in the conflict, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq declared war 
on Germany” (p. 182) during WWII. While these countries feared a hostile takeover if Germany 
were to win, they easily could have refused to join a side, but instead volunteered soldiers to 
fight and die for the West, not against it.  Currently, the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation 
Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) is a group of nations allied together in the fight against daesh in 
Iraq and Syria. Among the members are the United States, the Kingdom of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (“U.S., Coalition Strikes,” 2016).  Coalition members 
help not only with airstrikes against daesh, but also contribute other humanitarian aid that is 
needed for the area (“Operation Inherent Resolve,” n.d.).  Middle Eastern support of Western led 
military campaigns continues to be an integral part of U.S. military strategy around the world. 
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There are also non-violent Islamic movements around the world. One such movement, 
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (The Party of Islamic Liberation), refuses to engage in violence. Hizb 
ut-Tahrir “is an international Islamic movement, which calls for the unification of all Muslim 
countries into a single state” (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006, p. 316). However, unlike the 
forces in Syria and Iraq, Hizb ut-Tahrir refuses to use force or violence to create the single 
Muslim state. Karagiannis and McCauley conducted field research and concluded “that there are 
around 30,000 members and many more sympathizers” (p. 316).  When new members join, 
leaders of Hizb ut-Tahrir mandates that they take a course that explains the group’s ideology and 
hierarchy. Karagiannis and McCauley state that “there is a range of disciplinary measures for 
members who break the rules, with expulsion being the most severe penalty” (p. 317). When the 
leaders of the organization deal with members that do not fully adhere to their teachings, they 
resist physical violence. This organization has existed for 50 years with very few alterations to its 
structure or religious doctrine. Karagiannis and McCauley attribute this continued structure to 
the group’s “dogmatic and consistent implementation of its ideology, which envisions a peaceful 
overthrow of the existing regimes in Muslim countries” (p. 318). Hizb ut-Tahrir has adopted the 
use of evolving technology to spread its ideology, but refuses to adopt a violent effort to 
command control of Muslim states. However, the Western media refuses to focus on this 
growing group in favor of focusing on those institutions that favor the use of violence and claim 
to do so in the name of Islam. 
Fear of Muslims and Islam is potent in a lot of news stories and movies.  Individuals and 
groups are being misidentified as members of terrorist organizations and the stories surrounding 
these occurrences provides insight into what is being deemed important.  We are taught to fear 
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and hate things through our socialization process, we are not born with prejudice.  However, 
family and friend groups may not be the only influential individuals in our acquired prejudice.  
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to analyze the relationship between exposure to 
media consumption and the most common held beliefs about Arabs, Muslims, and Islam.  The 
media’s ability to cultivate an enemy for a nation must be explored and understood. The next 
chapter will explore how the United States and the mass media work together to fuel the 
Industrial War Machine through century old tropes. 
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many aspects of the mass media regularly advance the notion that all Muslims are 
terrorists and that all terrorists are Muslims through news stories and movies.  Anti-Islamic 
sentiment has grown so strong that Muslim children are afraid to go out in public, and 
individuals who even appear to be from the Middle East are labeled as terrorists.  However, this 
notion is not one that is unique to the media or the present political climate. 
The Middle Eastern Islamic terrorist is a long standing trope.  Many American politicians 
have successfully maintained the mental connection between “Muslim” and “terrorist” through 
ideological and social construction approaches.  The group with the most power in a given 
culture, the hegemon, chooses the ideological stance it determines to be superior and then 
reinforces this ideology through social mechanisms such as mass media.  These approaches are 
deeply rooted in Western constructions of Islam and the Middle East and remain consistent in the 
United States throughout the history of media representation.  As the tropes are pervasive in 
American media, it seems likely that frequent exposure to them will, according to cultivation 
theory (Gerbner, 2002), lead viewers to espouse anti-Islamic attitudes. 
Western Construction of Islam 
The West, specifically the United States, has used the cultural realm as a playground for 
advancing its own agenda, sometimes at the expense of people from other nations.  Winning the 
hearts and of minds of a populace is a common war tactic, and the West continues to utilize this 
tactic in its efforts to maintain support for its war machine.  The West does not appear ready to 
alter course in its continued targeting of the Middle East and Muslims.  This continued campaign 
is fueled through ideology, American hegemony, the collective memory, and rhetorical tactics. 
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Ideology 
Ideologies are used to explain that which occurs around us.  Hall (1986), who derives a 
lot of his notions on ideology from Gramsci, defines ideology as “the mental frameworks – the 
language, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation – 
which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and 
render intelligible the way society works” (p. 29).  Scholars agree that ideology involves power 
dynamics, hegemony, and world views, such that reality is constructed through those in power 
and that the masses are unaware of what is truly occurring because they are only privy to part of 
the information (Gramsci, 2012; Hall, 1972; McGee, 1980).   
Hegemony.  Who controls power and who is controlled by power is constantly shifting in 
society.  Hegemons utilize ideologies to maintain power and to order society.  Understanding 
how power flows through different social groups and societies is important in understanding how 
media promote the hegemon’s values and ideals.  Gramsci (1971) views power as gelatinous in 
that there is generally a main hegemon, but within each society there are smaller groups and 
smaller hegemons that reinforce or challenge the main hegemon.  Zompetti (2012) explains that 
those that possess the most wealth and influence are often those that achieve and maintain power 
to become the hegemons.  He contends that this occurs through the process of “alienation and 
commodification,” in which individuals are separated from social issues through the hegemon’s 
emphasis on valuing possessions and accumulating wealth (p. 4).   
 While power can be shared, Gramsci (1971) recognizes that there are individuals on the 
fringes of society who seem to have almost no power at all and refers to these groups as the 
subaltern.  These individuals are the ones that societies tend to ignore and silence.  “Common 
sense” encourages the subaltern to adhere to the policies of the hegemon, not to challenge their 
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position in society, and embrace the hegemonic cultural values and norms.  Gramsci defines 
“common sense” as “the uncritical and largely unconscious way of perceiving and understanding 
the world that has become ‘common’ in any given epoch” (p. 322).  The hegemon deters 
resistance from the subaltern because the subaltern are taught that how things are is how they 
have always been and will always be, and that changing would cause more harm than good.  The 
subaltern do not often contest their position in society because they have accepted that they are 
where they are because of things outside of their control.  The subaltern embraces common sense 
because it creates the false belief that the hegemonic ideals and values are good for them.  
Culture is constantly shaped by that which society experiences on a daily basis.  Daily 
experiences reinforce the culture the hegemon has deemed to be appropriate, and it occurs 
through many different avenues.  George (1994) explains that “discourse… generates the 
categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained” (p. 25).  If discourse 
did not exist, individuals would not be able to communicate with each other to establish norms 
and practices.  However, George does not reduce discourse to just language; he believes, rather, 
that it is “a broader matrix of social practices that gives meaning to the way that people 
understand themselves and their behavior” (p. 25).  In this sense, discourse is what allows those 
in power to dictate how those with less power should think about the world around them.  It is 
through discourse that the hegemon is able to utilize common sense to its advantage.   
Gramsci (1971) furthers the notion of discourse’s role in creating common sense with his 
discussion of the individual.  Gramsci argues that “man does not enter into relations with the 
natural world just by being himself part of the natural world, but actively, by means of work and 
technique. . .these relations. . .are active and conscious” (p. 352).  Individuals consciously 
examined the location in which they are placed and then choose a way to respond to the 
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environment.  Through common sense, individuals are given cognitive shortcuts to use, which 
aid them to quickly make decisions.  The individual is not an object that is told what to do, but 
rather a subject that is offered many forms of discourse from which to choose; but most, if not 
all, of these discourses encourage the individual to adhere to the hegemon.  In an attempt to 
pacify the subaltern, the hegemon utilizes a multitude of discourses and encourages the subaltern 
to use cognitive shortcuts based on common sense.  Often, these discourses become 
“naturalized,” so that it seems that the place of the subaltern is “naturally” marginal to the 
hegemon; certain relations between the hegemon and the subaltern become taken for granted.  At 
this point others produce and reproduce the marginalizing discourses even without intent, as they 
become part of collective memory and common sense. 
Collective memory.  Mumby (1989) also pulls from Gramsci’s notions of ideology, and 
contends that “meaning is…contingent not only on intersubjective understanding within a 
community, but also on the process by which certain dominant groups are able to frame the 
interests of competing groups within their own particular world-view” (p. 293).  Hegemons use 
ideology to create shared meaning so that they can dictate to the masses what they want them to 
understand and remember.  The deliberate explanation and organization of ideas creates a 
societal collective memory and view of certain situations and events.  The collective memory is 
comprised of opinions and thoughts that social groups agree upon as being true because it is what 
has always been known or stated.  This collective memory directly aids the hegemon because it 
provides a history that is articulated in such a way to emphasize acceptance of the hegemon as 
common sense (Durkheim, 1915; Tileaga, 2012; Zandberg, 2014).   
A group’s collective memory is always influenced by the hegemon.  Common sense and 
the collective memory work together to create a history that benefits the hegemon and its values.  
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Zandberg (2014) argues that the collective memories of a group also help to “mark its 
boundaries” (p.4).  The collective memory of a group creates the belief that the group truly 
knows what has happened in the past.  Althusser (2008) argues that ideologies “do not 
correspond to reality, i.e. that they constitute an illusion” (p. 36).  It is through this illusion, 
which culminates in the collective memory, that a hegemon is able to reinforce common sense 
and elicit compliance.  It must be noted that no society operates through a singular ideology 
because “ideology is always pluralistic”: Ideologies build upon each other and compete with 
each other at the same time (Berlin, 1988, p. 479).  The competition between ideologies allows 
the hegemon to ensure that “the overall effect of these permutations tends to support the 
hegemony of the dominant class” (Berlin, 1988, p. 479).  Without the competition, the hegemon 
has nothing to position itself against and risks the rise of a new hegemon.  This competition also 
aids the hegemon in interpolating individuals into its ideology.  Althusser (2008) explains that 
“ideology. . . ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects among the individuals, . . or 
‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects. . . by that very precise operation which I have called 
interpellation or hailing” (p. 48, emphasis in original).  Interpellation is similar to someone 
calling to another to get their attention and bring them over to join a group or a conversation.  It 
occurs more easily when the hegemon utilizes common sense and the collective memory to 
encourage new members of a society to join the dominant ideology. 
However, common sense and the collective memory are not always historically accurate.  
Hasain and Frank (1999) caution that, while history and the collective memory are 
complementary, they are not the same. Histories are what are accepted by the majority of the 
academic community to be accurate portrayals of past events while “collective memories, on the 
other hand, are the public acceptances or ratifications of this histories on the part of broader 
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audiences” (p. 98).  While history and the collective memory provide two different services, they 
both aid in understanding community identities and how ideologies come to be accepted and/or 
rejected (Hasain & Frank). 
Often the hegemon utilizes the media to reinforce the collective memory of a group. Edy 
(1999) explains that the collective memory is essential to society because it is “home to critical 
aspects of political culture, community tradition, and social identity” (p. 71).  The media play a 
large role in the production and reproduction of the collective memory because of their ability to 
reach large and varied audiences at one time.  Academic and political elites no longer reserve the 
right to “narrate the past” because “nowadays, major historical events gain their public meanings 
not only through academic and state-sponsored interpretations but also through the media” 
(Zandberg, 2014, p. 4).  Despite increased access to historical information, societies are 
beginning to view the media as “the authoritative tellers of past and the shapers of public 
memory” (p. 4).  Edy (1999) discusses how the media take a more tempestuous approach to 
history than to education, while the classroom is viewed to be more of an objective history.  
When the media cover history, they depict it as the “responsibility of individuals, rather than 
social forces” (p. 72).  The classroom is supposed to teach historical events in broad terms, while 
the mass media tend to focus on individuals they characterize as heroes or villains.  The larger 
societal, environmental, and political circumstances are not always thoroughly explored by the 
mass media; rather, a microscopic view of the situation is passed off as the sole cause of 
cataclysmic events.  Those in power decide how history is reported, either the hegemon will be 
covered as a hero or will be completely excluded in hopes of minimizing any questions about 
wrongdoing that occurred under their watch (Edy).  When a cultural or national trauma occurs, 
societies must find a way to understand it and generally turn to public discourse for this 
16 
 
understanding (Zandberg, 2014).  Zandberg further explains that “the media play a decisive role 
in representing cultural trauma and in recuperating from it, providing the symbolic means for a 
community to narratively reconnect past and present” (p. 12).  The mass media play a unique 
role in the narrative that allows for public agreement to be reached regarding traumatic events 
because of its large audience base and ability to bring many voices together in one place.  The 
media’s involvement with the hegemon and its role in collective memory make it a unique area 
for rhetorical analysis. 
Rhetoric 
Rhetoric involves all words and images that are meant to influence either an individual’s 
perception of the world or situation or to persuade an individual to do something.  Aristotle’s 
writings on rhetoric are one of the the oldest still in existence (Campbell & Huxmann, 2009).  
Aristotle introduced the rhetorical proofs of logos (logic), pathos (emotion), and ethos 
(credibility).  The situation in which speakers found themselves would determine how these 
proofs should be combined together.  Furthermore, rhetoric’s purpose was to supplant violence 
and coercion:  It was meant to bring about collaboration and further understanding.  Campbell 
and Huxmann (2009) explain that “Aristotle considered rhetoric an offshoot of logic, and a 
rhetorical perspective is characterized not only by an emphasis on social truths but also by an 
emphasis on reason-giving or justification in place of coercion or violence” (p. 4).  However, 
rhetoric's involvement in the creation of meaning has evolved to incorporate more than just the 
words of the message creator.  Campbell and Huxmann expand rhetoric’s definition by stating 
that rhetoric includes “the study of all the processes by which people influence each other 
through symbols, regardless of the intent of the source” (p. 7).  This broader definition of 
rhetoric allows for the examination of the arts as forms of rhetoric, but retains the ability to apply 
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Aristotle’s proofs in examination of how a certain form of rhetoric persuades an audience.  Also, 
Campbell and Huxmann’s definition provides the basis for an examination of a receiver’s 
perception of a message, allowing for the exploration of persuasion’s potential even when a 
sender did not intend for a message to be persuasive.   
While Aristotle focuses on the sender and the written word, Campbell and Huxman 
(2009) expand the definition of rhetoric to include visual rhetoric, allowing scholars to explore 
all aspects of a message.  They encourage the examination of messages that were never intended 
to be persuasive because of the possible persuasive nature of rhetoric that otherwise appears 
innocuous.  Understanding the persuasive nature of informational messages and their persuasive 
capabilities allows researchers to study seemingly neutral forms of communication and their 
possible hidden persuasion.  The notions of Campbell and Huxman allow the exploration of 
rhetoric utilized by the mass media, not only for news programing, but also the visual rhetoric of 
images on screens and in advertisements. 
Rhetoric and ideology.  Ideology cannot function or survive without rhetoric.  Rhetoric 
aids in the dissemination of the thoughts and ideas of individuals regarding how the world should 
be ordered and understood.  Berlin (1988) argues that, “instead of rhetoric acting as the 
transcendental recorder or arbiter of competing ideological claims, rhetoric is regarded as always 
ideological” (p. 477).  Rhetoric does not simply record history; it perpetuates ideas and thoughts, 
manipulating history and circumstances to be what the hegemon desires.  Ideology is always 
rhetorical because its very nature is designed to convince individuals of a particular world view:  
Ideology cannot exist without rhetoric. 
While each individual word is not always consciously chosen by a rhetor in every 
rhetorical act, all rhetorical acts are rooted in an ideological perspective.  Campbell and Huxman 
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(2009) define a rhetorical act as “an intentional, created, polished attempt to overcome the 
challenges in a given situation with a specific audience on a given issue to achieve a particular 
end” (p. 7).  Every rhetorical act is unique because no audience or situation is exactly the same.  
Also, “ideological formulations remain largely unconscious to both their speaker and their 
receivers,” making it is impossible to always know what ideology is guiding a rhetor at any 
given moment (Makus, 1990, p. 500). 
While rhetoric is occasionally used without an awareness of purpose, there are times 
when certain phrases are chosen with deliberate intent.  When crafting a rhetorical act for a 
specific purpose, the rhetor must employ some ideology to order their thoughts.  Berlin (1988) 
explains that “ideology provides the language to define the subject (the self), other subjects, the 
material world, and the relation of all of these to each other” (p. 479).  It is organized and 
formulated ideology that allows for a rhetor to explain a situation and to make sense of the world 
for a target audience.  This means that a rhetor can never escape reinforcing or using an ideology 
because the ideology is “inscribed in language practices, entering all features of our experience” 
(Berlin, 1988, p. 479).  Ideology dictates the way in which individuals construct their thoughts 
and phrases because the State utilizes ideology to order the world for its citizen to ensure that 
power remains with the State.  Those groups that do not find themselves to be part of the central 
group in power utilize ideology as well.  The groups found to be part of the subaltern often 
function through their own ideologies and employ those ideologies as a means to confront the 
hegemon (Gramsci, 1972). 
Political rhetoric.  States compete with other states, and hegemons within each state also 
compete with each other, often using the force of words.  Franck and Weisband (1971) examined 
for example, how the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States 
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challenged each other through rhetoric.  Their research finds that the rhetoric of public figures, 
whether politicians or celebrities, influenced state actions.  Therefore, realists are incorrect in 
their assumption that actions hold more weight in the international realm than words do.  Realists 
fail to recognize that rhetorical acts have the capacity to be equivalent to physical acts and hold 
just as much legitimacy in certain circumstances.  Franck and Weisband note that “verbal 
weapons are as ‘real’ in their strategic potential as missiles and submarines” (p. 118).  States are 
no longer only intimidated through the use of weapons; words can strike fear in the hearts of 
leaders.  States position each other through the rhetoric they use when speaking about the so-
called “Other.”  Rhetorical messages are perceived to possess the same seriousness as physical 
acts now because “signals, messages, [and] communications in bargaining situations” are 
regarded with high importance (pp. 118-119).  The counterbalance of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction creates a political atmosphere where differences must be settled 
through the use of words rather than weapons because the risk to human life is too great.  States 
can now turn to rhetorical weapons before they are forced to resort to physical weapons to 
intimidate each other.  Even though the Cold War has ended, the threat of a nuclear exchange 
still looms, and countries are constantly on high alert.  An example of this is the current 
possibility of Iran nuclearizing and Russia’s recent seizure of Crimea (Vasovic & Baczynska, 
2014). 
Military strategy is not solely composed of when to send troops and how to position 
them, but it considers all public rhetorical statements as well.  States now understand that allies 
are more important than ever.  The world has become so integrated that a country must not only 
defend itself but must also ensure that those countries that it is economically and politically tied 
to are also protected.  This acquisition of allies occurs through verbal posturing between 
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superpowers (or hegemons) who seek to establish superiority over the other in the minds of 
smaller countries.  Cox (1983) contends that “the hegemonic concept of world order is founded 
not only upon the regulation of inter-state conflict but also upon a globally-conceived civil 
society” (p. 171).  Focusing on a nation’s own problems is no longer sufficient, states must look 
abroad and ensure that their national image is viewed favorably.  Cox furthers that “the economic 
and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with national hegemony become 
patterns for emulation abroad” (p. 171).  A superpower is able to widen their influence quicker 
when their institutions, culture, and technology are emulated abroad.   
However, not only the state leaders but also individuals that are recognized as 
representatives of the state must carefully craft their messages.  Franck and Weisband (1971) 
explain that “the official speaking for the state is expected to mean what he says – not simply 
whatever he thinks he means but what to the reasonable listener will be the logical concomitant 
of the words” (p. 121).  This is because other states look to officials as representatives and 
interpret that when a state’s representative speaks they are speaking on behalf of their country, 
and their words are as definite as policy actions.  Gramsci (1971) believes that social classes 
could be the site of hegemonic power struggles, and Cox (1983) argues that “the working class, 
which might be considered to be international in an abstract sense, nationalises itself in the 
process of building its hegemony” (p. 169).  When a new group or leader emerges on the 
national stage it is likely that they will have an impact internationally because of the 
interconnectedness of the world. 
Additionally, the future must always be considered when verbal statements are being 
prepared.  This is because when a state makes an official announcement, other states often 
interpret this to mean that this new path will guide all future actions in similar situations.  Franck 
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and Weisband (1971) warn that when “a superpower like the United States speaks, its words 
affect not only those specific events to which they are addressed, but also the international 
system as a whole, and thus the options available in a subsequent crisis” (p. 122).  Also, states 
will take cues on how to act in a crisis from the superpowers, meaning that the superpower must 
understand that the way it acts may encourage reciprocal action from other states during similar 
situations.  Superpowers must ensure that every time their representatives publicly speak, their 
words are carefully chosen.  Superpowers have the unique capacity to reinforce and transform 
current political patterns with a single rhetorical act, but they must always remember that “words 
define state action” (p. 128).  When a superpower designates a response to a certain situation as 
acceptable it must remember that it is not only designating the response acceptable for 
themselves, but for the entire world. 
Ideographs. The way in which reality is created and individuals are brought into 
believing they are a part of a community involves an intricate weaving of rhetoric and ideology.  
McGee (1980a) set out to understand how ideology, myth, and rhetoric worked together to trick 
the public’s minds so that we are deluded “into believing that we ‘think’ with/through/for a 
society to which we ‘belong’” (p. 4).  McGee coined the term “ideographs” as “the political 
language which manifests ideology. . .  characterized by slogans, a vocabulary. . .  easily 
mistaken for technical terminology of political philosophy” (p. 5).  Ideographs simultaneously 
exist on a synchronic (occurring at a single point in time) and a diachronic (developing through 
time) level of interpretation.  Reality is created through language, and the human brain prefers 
shortcuts when processing information; this is where ideographs are extremely helpful.  McGee 
clarifies that “the concept ‘ideograph’ is meant to be purely descriptive of an essentially social 
human condition. . . .  Attention is called to the social, rather than rational or ethical, functions of 
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a particular vocabulary” (p. 8).  Ideographs are not based on rational thought, rather they inscribe 
the emotional and social reaction to a single word.  Furthermore, McGee explains that 
ideographs are not created through pure observation, rather “they come to be as a part of the real 
lives of the people whose motives they articulate” (p. 7).  These single words are able to evoke 
more meaning than a claim or full argument can ever hope to achieve (McGee, 1980b).  McGee 
explains that, “like Chinese symbols, they signify and ‘contain’ a unique ideological 
commitment” (pp. 74). 
While McGee (1980a, 1980b) focused on the ideograph through a political lens, scholars 
have expanded to include other parts of society’s rhetoric (Bennett-Carpenter & McCallion, 
2012; Cloud, 2004; Lingarajan, 2011). Bennett-Carpenter and McCallion (2012) define 
ideographs as operating “as a totem. . .  across societies, providing a symbolic reference point for 
the agendas, practices, and identities of all those involved” (p. 2).  No longer does the scholar 
need to confine their research into how only politicians use words to wield power, but also how 
other groups within societies use ideographs as a way to gather support or insight dissent.  
Bennett-Carpenter and McCallion explicitly state that “the use of ideographs need not be 
exclusive to politics” (p. 3).  They distinguish between first- and second-order ideographs.  First-
order ideographs are those words that bring large groups together, words such as <freedom>, 
<liberty>, <death>, and <success>; while second-order ideographs operate “on a micro level” 
and are used within smaller specialized groups (p. 5).  Second-order ideographs can use first-
order ideographs, but the meaning can change between groups, such as the Roman Catholic 
Church using <new evangelization> as a descriptor of the way it proselytizes (Bennet-Carpenter 
& McCallion).  Cloud (2004) also explores how the ideograph can extend beyond the political.  
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When exploring the power of a visual ideograph, one must look into how an iconic image 
is diachronically used to invoke a response.  Cloud (2004) explains that “visual ideographs are 
more than recurring iconic images that shift in meaning depending on context; they also index 
verbal ideographic slogans, making abstractions. . .  concrete” (p. 287).  Mass media consistently 
replay images in an effort to quickly evoke a response from the viewer, such as <pride>, 
<nationalism>, or <patriotism>. This is especially true during times of war or strife.  The 
creation of an in and out-group is wordlessly created through images in newscasts and other 
forms of mass media (Cloud).  Visual ideographs occur during times of conflict because “this 
binary construction strengthens national identification, entailing rigid disidentification with and 
scapegoating of the Other” (p. 290).  Cloud explores visual ideographs through the way that 
Afghan women were portrayed during the American invasion of Afghanistan after September 11, 
2001.  The images of women suffering and the violent pictures of Afghani men resulted in 
images that “do not state the ideograph <clash of civilizations> as much as they become the 
clash in visual condensations of the meanings of ‘American’ and ‘Other’” (p. 291).  Images of 
a bearded ‘middle-Eastern-looking’ man wearing a black cloak and turban can trigger an 
entire series of images of a fanatical religious movement, of airplane hijackings, of 
Western hostages held helpless in dungeons, of truck bombs illing hundreds of innocent 
people, of cruel punishments sanctioned by ‘Islamic law’ and of the suppression of 
human rights – in sum, of intellectual and moral regression. (Karim, 2006, p. 118)   
In the era of easily accessible visual mass media there is no longer the need to rely on language 
to convey an ideograph; images are now able to do work of words. 
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Media Effects 
Althusser (2008) argues that hegemons use not only repressive means to maintain their 
control, but also “ideological state apparatuses” (p. 17), such as the education system, religion, 
and the media.  Thus, while the West uses politicians to advance its anti-Islamic sentiments, it 
also utilizes the mass media.  Political speeches and official announcements typically reach only 
those individuals who specifically follow politics or politicians.  However, the mass media 
provide a venue where a wider range of individuals can be influenced through repeated 
portrayals of a threat without their knowledge.  The mass media provide a unique theatre for 
political messages to be disseminated without consumers actively knowing the message is 
political.  To establish the role of the media, we must first consider how the media frame Islam 
and the Middle East (within the notion of agenda setting) and then consider whether such 
framing has specific effects on audiences, cultivating for them an anti-Islamic mindset.   
Agenda Setting 
McCombs and Shaw (1972) first explored the idea of agenda-setting in regards to 
political communication in the 1970s.  They conducted a study in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, to 
discover what issues individuals focused on during the 1972 presidential election and whether 
the issues they found to be the most important to the public were the issues most commonly 
covered by the media.  While their findings were not confirmed, they did find a strong 
correlation between the media’s prominent issues and on the public’s issues of focus (McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972).  According to agenda-setting theory, the public is likely to focus on the issues 
that are covered the most by the media because the media are generally the only source of 
political information easily available to the public.  Shaw and Martin (1992) define agenda-
setting as “a matching of issue patterns by collections of people in a social system” (p. 906).  
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Further research into agenda-setting has uncovered that the way an issue is treated does not 
affect how important an issue is; the amount of coverage is the only thing that matters (Borah, 
2011).   
The news agenda is co-created by the media and the public and results in the public 
holding the same “five to seven issues” to be important, and, due to “widely shared values, the 
agenda across media does not greatly differ from day to day” (Shaw & Martin, 1992, p. 905).  
The public is complicit in their participation of matching interests because it has given the media 
the power to choose the stories.  Shaw and Martin describe the full process of agenda-setting as 
beginning with the understanding that: 
Events are not issues, although some events may lead to issues.  Journalists deal with 
these every day as individuals also do when they come in contact with them in their own 
lives.  Individuals take cues from journalists (and also from other media content, such as 
entertainment programs), from other agenda setting institutions (schools, churches, work) 
and from reference groups such as those suggested by one’s gender, race, age or social or 
economic class…The end result of the total agenda-setting process is an influence on 
either our cognitive or actual observable behavior.  (p. 917) 
The conclusion Shaw and Martin draw is that, at the very least, agenda-setting influences the 
way the public organizes information, and, at the most, it spotlights public issues and draws the 
public closer to a consensus on what these issues are.   
The media set the agenda in different ways.  Newspapers set the agenda through “the size 
of the headline, the length of the story, and the page on which the story appears,” and television 
does it through the “position of an item in the newscast and the length of the story” (McCombs & 
Bell, 1996, p. 95).  Agenda-setting provides the mechanism through which media control the 
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issues on which the public focuses and is informed.  One of the first blatant uses of agenda-
setting was the sudden public concern regarding illegal drug use.  McCombs and Bell (1996) 
highlight how the “public concern about drugs began to build after The New York Times 
‘discovered’ the drug problem in 1985” (p. 104).  The placement of stories about the threat that 
cocaine and other illicit drugs posed society first appeared in The Times and the “problem” was 
reinforced when the next year Len Bias and Don Rogers, two professional sports players, died in 
drug-related deaths.  Media exploited the few occurrences that surrounded illegal drug use as a 
way to fuel the narrative about the justification for the War on Drugs.   
Utilizing the media as a way to direct public attention often benefits the hegemon and 
allows for easier misdirection.  Shaw and Martin (1992) found that, as readership of newspapers 
increases, there is an increase in agreement with the media agenda and an increase in agreement 
between men and women.  However, Shaw and Martin do not argue that this is an agreement 
where the solution to an issue is provided, just an agreement as to whether the issue is important 
or not.  Shaw and Martin conducted a second study into the agenda put forth by television news 
and found similar results: “Data from both newspapers and television…influence us toward a 
common agenda of public issues and…away from the agenda perhaps associated with our unique 
historic reference groups if we read/view enough” (p. 917).   
Agenda-setting reinforces the collective memory narrative of the hegemon.  It is through 
media that discord is silenced to the best of the hegemon’s ability and the agenda of the hegemon 
is highlighted.  While journalism classes often teach that the presentation of a diversity of 
agendas is ideal, media corporations discourage the coverage of too many different agendas 
because of the possible chaos that could ensue.  Those that control the agenda for the media 
focus on the creation of “a set of agreed-upon news agenda values,” which precludes diversity or 
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challenging those in power (Shaw & Martin, 1992, p. 906).  The “day-to-day rule is the 
watchdog theory,” which states that journalists will focus on those that are already in power and 
will criticize those marginal groups that attempt to challenge those in power (pp. 906-907).  
Agenda-setting is what allows for the hegemon to co-opt issues of the periphery and reinforce 
the collective memory which reinforces the hegemon’s role and position in society. 
In addition to the public and news agenda, there is the policy agenda.  Dearing and Roger 
(1996) explain that “the policy agenda is of key importance because it represents an outcome of 
activity and influence on the media agenda and on the public agenda” (p. 72).  The public and 
news agenda highlight issues in society, but do not provide a solution to the problem.  The policy 
agenda seeks to explain what should and/or will be done in response to a problem.  The news and 
public agenda fuel the political agenda because “policymakers pay close attention to and are 
often forced to respond to media coverage” (p. 74).  The policy agenda is what can be found in 
court dockets, town-hall agendas, and in legislation (Dearing & Roger).  While the news reporter 
is often in search of the timeliest story, politicians will often track the news agenda over a period 
of time before making a decision on what to focus.  The politicians’ response will not always be 
covered by the news media, but the policy agenda will almost always be influenced by the news 
and public agenda.  
Agenda-setting encourages salience to transfer from media to the public (McCombs, 
2005).  Salience occurs when “elements prominent in the media agenda become prominent over 
time on the public agenda” (p. 546).  This transfer of salience occurs in the first two levels of 
agenda-setting; the first level identifies which general issues are deemed important and the 
second level focuses on specific aspects of the chosen issues (Littlejohn & Foss, 2011).  
McCombs (2005) created a third level of agenda-setting which involves accounting for the 
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amount of effort required by the audience in staying informed on the issue when setting the 
agenda.  The fourth level of agenda-setting begins with the question “If the press sets the public 
agenda, who sets the media agenda?” (p. 548).  McCombs posits that journalists are constantly 
looking for affirmation that the story they are covering is, in fact, the correct story to be 
covering, which has led to reports that stories are all very similar across news media.  
Furthermore, during television reports, stations will invite journalists from other sources to 
discuss issues which can artificially legitimize issue choice.  The latter stages of agenda-setting 
identify three consequences for which media outlets must be prepared: “forming an opinion, 
priming opinions about public figures through an emphasis on particular issues, and shaping an 
opinion through an emphasis on particular attributes” (p. 549).  The mass media must be 
prepared to defend their agenda and the consequences of that agenda.  While agenda-setting 
examined how a message is formed, framing and priming, which constitute some of the higher 
levels of agenda-setting, explore the way the issue is discussed and whether an impact is 
predetermined for the audience through that discussion. 
Priming the audience and framing the problem.  Priming theory explains how the 
media have influential power over audience members’ emotions towards a story or idea.  
Although priming and agenda-setting occur at the same time, they are separate acts.  Lee (2005) 
explains that priming aids the audience in knowing “how to think about” an issue, while agenda-
setting aids the audience in knowing “what to think about” (pp. 7-8).  In politics, media provide 
moral compasses and benchmarks for the public to utilize when rating the effectiveness of a 
governmental entity.  Through providing the framework for evaluation, the media can 
predetermine the impact or decision for their audience.   
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Framing theory explores the ways in which media producers portray messages through 
mass news media.  Borah (2011) explains that framing focuses on the way an issue is presented, 
not the frequency of the issue’s discussion.  That is, while the frequency of an issue’s occurrence 
can impact the public’s opinion, framing is only concerned with the formation of the story.  
Goffman (1974) hypothesizes that framing allows media to utilize fabrication, which he defines 
as “the intentional effort of one or more individuals to manage activity so that a party of one or 
more others will be induced to have a false belief about it is that is going on” (p. 83).  Framing 
allows the media to create a false truth that is accepted by the public.  Generally, this false truth 
is readily accepted because common sense has taught the public that the news media provide 
only true information (Landy, 1994).  Framing also enables viewers to process information more 
quickly.  Pan and Kosicki (1993) explain that “we may conceive a news media frame as a 
cognitive device used in information encoding, interpreting, and retrieving” (p. 57).  Frames 
allow for the viewer’s brain to quickly catalogue information and orient “information in a unique 
context so that certain elements of the issue get a greater allocation of an individual’s cognitive 
resources” (p. 57).  Frames also utilize rhetorical structures to provide cognitive shortcuts.  
Rhetorical structures are also used by journalists “to invoke images, increase salience of a point, 
and increase vividness of a report,” all in the effort to establish their story as a fact of reality (p. 
62).  Frames and rhetorical structures aid the journalist to be seen as reporting reality and an 
authority in the community (p. 62).  Without these journalistic practices, frames would have a 
harder time creating salience and resonating with their audience (Pan & Kosicki).  
Benford and Snow (2000) further the idea that false belief can be derived through frames 
when they explain that information “must be believable to some segment of prospective or actual 
adherents” (p. 620), but not all of a viewing audience must agree.  As long as some subset of a 
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population will agree with the frame, then the framers will be successful.  In regards to social 
movement frames, Benford and Snow argue that “hypothetically, the more central or salient the 
espoused beliefs, ideas, and values of a movement to the targets of mobilization, the greater the 
probability of their mobilization” (p. 621).  The involvement of social movements in the issue’s 
frame is important because it impacts whether the hegemon or the movement persuade more 
individuals (Benford & Snow).  Connecting different frames also helps pull individuals together 
and increases action regarding an issue.  Benford and Snow explain that “frame bridging refers to 
the linking of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames” (p. 624) 
and that that bridging is key to securing more individuals involved in a movement.  However, 
hegemons can also use bridging as a way to subvert social change.  The combination of agenda-
setting, framing, and priming aids the media’s ability to cultivate the reality the hegemon wants 
accepted.   
Cultivating Reality 
Cultivation began with a focus on perceptions of violence due to television viewing.  
Study after study indicates that individuals who watch an increased amount of television are 
more likely to perceive the world to be full of crime, despite the fact that crime rates are 
dropping in the U.S. (Northup, 2010).  The belief in a “scary world” for heavy viewers has led 
cultivation scholars to present another possible impact that media could have on viewers--the 
creation of a sense of what the world is like.  However, the theory has also been applied to 
stereotypes in the media. 
Cultivation theory.  Cultivation theory emerged in mass communication research during 
the 1960s through the work of George Gerbner.  In Gerbner’s 1972 seminal work, he (2002) 
explains that cultivation analysis is a multi-step process that “begins with the insights of the 
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study of institutions and the message systems they produce” and ends with “the contributions 
that these systems and their symbolic functions make to the cultivation of assumptions about life 
and the world” (p. 186).  Gerbner believes that agreement or disagreement with the subject or 
aspect of life being discussed does not affect whether or not a group would see the representation 
as a reflection of real life.  Gerbner explains that “in the general process of image formation and 
cultivation both ‘fact’ and ‘fable’ play significant and interrelated roles” (pp. 186-187).  Since 
Gerbner first proposed cultivation theory “over 500 studies directly relevant to cultivation have 
been published” (Morgan & Shanahan, 2010, p. 337).  Bailey and Park (2006) expanded upon 
Gerbner’s work and now define cultivation theory as “the theory that long-term television 
viewing has effects on audiences’ perception of social reality” (p. 3).  Morgan and Shanahan 
(2010) further refine the definition of the cultivation hypothesis as the proposition that “those 
who spend more time watching television are more likely to perceive the real world in ways that 
reflect the most common and recurrent messages of the world of fictional television” (p. 337).  
While original hypotheses focus on the general effects of overall viewing, assuming all media 
are consistent in their depiction of certain realities, recent cultivation scholars have focused on 
fictional television and news programming specifically (Morgan & Shanahan).    
 Bailey and Park (2006) explain that cultivation studies use “surveys and statistical 
content analysis” in an effort to “test and validate theoretical (and critical) insights and 
commitments” so that the “difference in perceptions of aspects of social reality between light and 
heavy television viewers” can hopefully be explained while accounting for moderating variables 
(pp. 11-12).  Content analyses and surveys represent the multi-stage approach that Gerbner’s 
cultural indicator analysis uses.  There are three unique stages in cultivation theory research.  
Bailey and Park outline these stages as: 
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1) institutional analysis investigating how media messages are selected, produced, and 
distributed, 2) message system analysis addressing the recurrent images in media content, 
and 3) cultivation analysis which studies how exposure to television messages contributes 
to viewers’ perceptions of social reality.  (p. 13) 
Each stage functions together, but separately each stage is a different form of analysis.  While all 
steps provide unique analysis for media studies, using all three together provides the clearest 
explanation of the media’s influence on viewers’ perception of the real world. 
The concepts of mainstreaming and resonance function in cultivation theory only through 
the combination of the above three frameworks.  The concept of mainstreaming refers to how 
“heavy viewing of television may absorb or override differences in perspectives and behavior 
which ordinarily arose from other influences” (Bailey & Park, 2006, p. 14).  The dominant group 
utilizes mainstreaming to promote its ideology.  As it applies to ethnic stereotypes, 
mainstreaming helps to ensure that portrayals of ethnicities in mass media will become common 
sense and believed more easily by—or become more salient to—those that consume higher 
amounts of mass media.  However, scholars believe that resonance may combat mainstreaming 
(Gerbner et al., 1980; Shrum & Bischak, 2001, Griffin, Ledbetter & Sparks, 2015).  Shrum and 
Bischak (2001) explain that “resonance predicts an interaction between television viewing and 
life experience that is essentially opposite of mainstreaming” (p. 191).  Individuals that 
experience something in their lives are likely to interpret events from media as reality, even 
when they consume little media.  Those that have direct or indirect experience with Islamic or 
Muslim terrorism will likely interpret all representations of terrorism through the media through 
an Islamic or Middle Eastern lens.  Inversely, individuals that have experienced positive 
interactions with Muslims or Middle Easterners will be less likely to accept depictions of 
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terrorism as being caused by Middle Easterners and/or Muslims.  Nacos and Torres-Reyna 
(2007) report that “less than a year after 9/11. . . .  Nearly two-thirds (63 percent) of the public 
thought that Americans were more fearful of Muslims rather than felt sympathy for them” (p. 
56).  Cultivation studies are concerned with analyzing how the symbolic world of television 
permeates reality.   
Middle Easterners and Muslims face a large amount of stereotyping in the media.  
Brinson (2011) explains that in relation to Muslims and Middle Easterners “media stereotypes. . . 
have been magnified and exacerbated over the last two decades” (p. 3).  Adventure and role 
playing games involving the Middle East and Muslims are generally portrayed through a quasi-
historic lens; while, first-person shooter games portray Muslims and the Middle East as in 
constant conflicts and perpetual enemies of the West (Naji & Iwar, 2013).  News stories tend to 
“stick to. . . the image of Muslims as unclean, social deviants and security threats” (p. 124).  Naji 
and Iwar (2013) believe that Western video games “probably have been influenced by news 
media” and argue that “what exists here is a complete cycle of ignorance reproducing false 
representation” (p. 125).  It is a rare exception when a news story involving Muslims is one of a 
positive nature.  Even when there is a positive story regarding “scientific breakthroughs, 
innovations in socio-economic development or cultural performance. . . the terms ‘Islam’, 
‘Islamic’ or ‘Muslim’ are usually not mentioned” (Karim, 2006, p. 116).  Furthermore, despite 
the stories “that address the considerable differences in views held by Muslims on terrorism and 
relations with the West,” the media overwhelmingly depict “most followers of Islam as a threat” 
(p. 117).  
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Cultivating stereotypes.  Gerbner, Morgan, and Signorielli (2002) explain that 
“television has become the primary common source of socialization and everyday information” 
(p. 193).  Television permeates life from infancy through death, ranging from information on 
politics to providing entertainment. However, viewing only one program is not enough; rather 
Gerbner et al. stress that “what is most likely to cultivate stable and common conceptions of 
reality is…the overall pattern of programming to which total communities are regularly exposed 
over long periods of time” (p. 195).  The more media are consumed by a viewer, the more likely 
that viewer is to conflate reality with that which is portrayed by mass media. 
It is this cultivation aspect of television that has made it a lead creator and/or reinforcer of 
culture.  Culture is cultivated through exposure to “roles of gender, age, class, vocation”; it also 
is seen in “modes of conformity and targets for rebellion” (Gerbner et al., 2002, p. 215).  
Furthermore, culture establishes the “range of personalities, temperaments, mentalities” deemed 
acceptable and provides the basis for “selfless acts of courage and sacrifice; and makes us accept 
(and perpetrate) repression and slaughter of unknown people assigned to the appropriate 
categories of barbarians and enemies” (p. 215).  Mass media portray everything involved in 
creating a culture, making them a key area of analysis in the study of stereotypes.  These 
stereotypes are represented so often that it becomes common sense to viewers that certain tropes 
are just inherently true.  
Common sense is key to the acceptance of stereotypes, which makes all stereotypes 
inherently culture based.  Bratanova and Kashima (2014) define a cultural stereotype as 
“representations of a social group shared in a community” (p. 157).  The repetition of these 
representations is necessary for them to become common sense within a society and mass media 
is a great way to do that quickly.  Many studies have been conducted surrounding 
35 
 
communication and stereotypes (Hughes & Baldwin, 2002; Vergeer, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 
2000; Weiman, 2000; Zhang, 2010).  Weiman (2000) highlights how some groups of individuals 
are only introduced to others through mass media.  Hughes and Baldwin (2002) contend that 
there is no such thing as a positive stereotype: All stereotypes are negative because “first, holders 
of these stereotypes negatively bias individual thought process…And second, their negative 
impact is found largely because they form a cognitively simplistic impression of the person” (p. 
114).  Stereotypes not only impact the way individuals act with members of the stereotyped 
group, but also risk negatively affecting the self-esteem of the stereotyped and hindering 
communication (Hughes & Baldwin).   
Cultivation and threat construction.  News programs are integral to the creation of the 
threat, in particular the Muslim threat, because the news media are often viewed to be unbiased 
in their coverage of international events.  International relations are generally not well 
understood by the public because of the public’s limited direct contact with foreigners and lack 
of international relations focus in schools, making the news media the public’s primary exposure 
to individuals outside of their home country.  Furthermore, fabricating facts allows the State to 
ensure that the Other is portrayed in a manner in line with framing it as a threat to the individuals 
that rely on the State’s protection.  Priming and framing allow the State to utilize the common 
sense belief that mass news media only tells an unbiased truth about the world to spread lies 
among the public. 
The State can only successfully construct an enemy when it is able to successfully portray 
the nation’s security as actively threatened.  During such a time, the State uses the portrayed 
enemy as a way to reinforce the hegemon’s values and to elicit the public’s active participation 
in ensuring the continuation of those values (Merskin, 2009).  The enemy the State decides to use 
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must not only be seen as something outside of its society, but also a significant threat.  Therefore, 
the enemy is constructed as a deviant and is then:  
contrasted with an ‘innocent’ or ‘helpless’ victim population who bear the brunt of the 
newly found social evil.  The more innocents perceived as being affected by the social 
problem, the greater the likelihood of public attention and support for the creation of 
policy targeting unpopular groups.  (Kappeler & Kappeler, 2004, p. 178) 
The creation of the enemy usually takes place through the use of inflammatory rhetoric from 
politicians and reporters.  News agencies and politicians rely on graphic images to prime their 
audience to fear the Other.  States must not only find the perfect balance between creating a 
significant threat and ensuring that the threat can be solved by the State. 
How an enemy is chosen by a state varies each time.  Enemies are born out of “difference 
in age, race, religion, culture, or appearance” (Merskin, 2009, p. 159).  The ability to isolate a 
specific feature or characteristic that denotes who is and who is not a threat provides the 
necessary rhetorical weapons to persuade the populace that the State is correct.  It is through this 
enemy that the State can “distract attention and divert aggression and energy toward a common 
threat” (p. 159).  When a State needs to justify an action, or distract the citizens from a mishap, it 
often turns to an enemy as a scapegoat.  Movies, news programs, and platform speeches from 
those in power all serve to ensure that the Other is successfully constructed and not forgotten.  
Due to the proliferation of political rhetoric in movies and fictional television shows, political 
speeches and news reports are no longer the only places States look for information regarding 
popular political beliefs.  Hollywood and news reporters are now seen as valid sources regarding 
official governmental policies. 
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Stereotypes aid in the construction of enemies, because when a group of individuals is 
framed in one way it is easier to discriminate against them all.  As Merskin (2009) states, “Once 
an individual is constructed as an outsider it is no longer thought of as having humanity” (p. 
161).  The need to identify our enemies as being devoid of humanity promotes a lack of empathy 
or remorse for the actions taken against them, even if the actions result in mass death.  Spillman 
and Spillman outline the steps involved in the creation and dehumanization of an enemy: 
• Negative Anticipation.  All acts of the enemy, in the past, present, and future become 
attributed to destructive intentions toward one’s own group. Whatever the enemy 
undertakes is meant to harm us. 
• Putting Blame on the Enemy.  The enemy is thought to be the source of any stress on a 
group. They are guilty of causing the existing strain and current negative conditions. 
• Identification with Evil.  The values of the enemy represent the negation of one’s own 
value system, and the enemy is intent on destroying the dominant value system as well.  
The enemy embodies the opposite of that which we are and strive for; the enemy wishes 
to destroy our highest values and must therefore be destroyed. 
• Zero-Sum Thinking.  What is good for the enemy is bad for us and vice versa. 
• Stereotyping and De-Individualization.  Anyone who belongs to the enemy group is 
ipso facto our enemy. 
• Refusal to Show Empathy.  Consideration for anyone in the enemy group is repressed 
due to perceived threat and feelings of opposition.  There is nothing in common and no 
way to alter that perception.  (emphasis in original, as quoted by Merskin, 2009, p. 160) 
If any of these essential components is missing, it is unlikely that a group will be successfully 
labeled as an enemy due to the fact that the humanity of its members will not be completely 
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nullified.  Every level that Spillman and Spillman discuss is essential to the successful 
dehumanization of the Other.  If any significant portion of the populace is allowed to see 
humanity in an enemy and then spread the belief that the group identified as the Other has been 
wrongly portrayed, the State risks failing in its attempt to construct the enemy as a threat.  This is 
why, when religion is used as a marker for an enemy, the State works very hard to silence all 
discourse that attempts to highlight those that are different and possibly good (Merskin, 2009). 
Due to the usefulness of having an enemy, the State often ensures one exists, meaning 
that when an original enemy’s threat significantly decreases in magnitude, a new one is created 
to take its place.  When the USSR collapsed, the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO) had 
to identify a new threat to sustain its existence.  NATO justified its continued existence through 
the argument that the newly formed states needed assistance in transitioning into capitalist states 
to ensure that Russia would not rise again.  This continuing redefinition of the threat occurs 
because, as Huysmans (1998) posits, “The threat construction – the externalization of fear – also 
moderates the level of uncertainty, the fact that one does not know whom to fear and whom not 
to fear” (p. 235).  When the community is uncertain of whom to fear and whom to accept, they 
are left without a clear understanding of the need of the state.  This is why “it becomes necessary 
to create ever more menacing threats to reestablish difference,” because the State is constantly in 
need of an existing entity that is different from its subjects (Lipschutz, 1995, p. 9).  The enemy 
does not have to be genuine: As long as the State is able to convince the masses that a threat 
exists and must be quelled, the masses are likely to believe the State.  The State values security 
because, when it is able to establish security for its populace, it is less likely to have its power 
internally challenged.  Its power can grow through victories against the Other, which further 
entrenches the value of the State in the collective memory of the populace.  Der Derian (1995) 
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explains how “the security of the sovereign…and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, 
uncertainty, paradox – all that makes a free life worthwhile” (p. 36).  The State creates this belief 
that the “free life” it provides is the best and that it must be protected at all costs.   
As an example of this process, during WWII the United States employed the media to 
encourage everyone to support the war effort, no matter the cost.  One month after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, “coast newspapers, and particularly those owned by William Randolph Hearst, 
took up the cry” to forcibly remove Japanese individuals from the West Coast (Rostow, 1945, p. 
497).  The fear of another attack these stories created resulted in Executive Order No.  9066 
being issued on February 19, 1942, and gave the military the power to designate “military areas” 
around the country, areas were Japanese individuals could be interned at indefinitely, without 
charge (p. 497).  The government won approval for these internment camps through the media 
attempts to “depict the Japanese as sinister and untrustworthy” (Fujitani, White, & Yoneyama, 
2001, p. 39).  Okihiro and Sly (1983) explain how daily the newspapers would allege “espionage 
and sabotage by the Japanese in America” in order to increase racial tensions (p. 67).  The threat 
of another attack on U.S. soil by the Japanese was inflated to convince the public to allow the 
government to deny rights to thousands of individuals.   
Threat inflation enables the State to persuade its constituents more easily that a threat 
requires immediate action.  Kaufmann (2004) explains that threat inflation involves:  
(1) claims that go beyond the range of ambiguity that disinterested experts would credit 
as plausible; (2) a consistent pattern of worst-case assertions over a range of factual 
issues that are logically unrelated or only weakly related…;(3) use of double standards in 
evaluating intelligence in a way that favors worst-case threat assessments; or (4) claims 
based on circular logic.  (p. 9)  
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While median voters possess “strong incentives to scrutinize expansionist arguments,” and 
should therefore quickly dismiss threat inflation, they often do not (p. 33).  The median voter 
willingly accepts the threat of the Other, especially the international Other, due to a lack of 
personal interaction with them and because of the common sense belief that news media do not 
lie about international affairs (Kaufman).  It is this failing of the marketplace of ideas regarding 
international threats that continues to perpetuate the success of threat construction.  In 1987, US 
News and World Report ran reports on “Islamic fundamentalism” in response to Khomeini’s 
takeover of Iran.  Reports explained that the Sunni youth were following the lead of the Iranian 
Shah in using martyrdom to fight for that which they believed.  However, as Said (1997) 
explains, “No one bothers to ask…how verifiable is the statement that martyrdom is spreading 
among Sunni youth, all several hundred million of them…and, if it is, what sort of evidence it is 
likely to be in the first place” (p. xix).  There was no discussion; it was just reported and 
accepted that the reports were correct.  The blatant acceptance by media audiences or everyday 
citizens of such claims without pressing for full arguments is one way the State uses rhetoric to 
quickly create a threat.  While debates over domestic issues seem to demand high levels of 
analysis, issues regarding Islam and foreign affairs are accepted as Truth when just glossed over 
by news reports. 
 In the United States, the Department of Defense (DOD) plays a significant role in the 
creation of threats.  President Eisenhower coined the idea of “the military industrial complex” 
during his presidency.  Eland (2008) explains how the DOD is in charge of the majority of 
efforts directed towards identifying possible threats to the safety of the U.S. and uses these 
possible threats as a means to justify an ever increasing budget (para 1).  The military industrial 
complex and the possibility of a threat is how threats are constructed, even during times of peace.  
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The negative portrayal of Islam and Muslims has deep roots in Western European culture, with a 
trajectory of the creation of threat construction of Muslims clearly developing in recent U.S. 
American media.   
Media Depiction of Arabs in Western Thought 
Arabs tend to be the main threat constructed by Western media.  Weimann (2000) 
contends that “one of the most unsympathetic and derogatory portrayals of ethnic or religious 
groups in Western media is that of Arabs” (p. 222).  Arab men and women are consistently 
depicted negatively, resulting in the images now being considered “part of the folklore” (p. 224).  
All of these stereotypes seem to be engrained in Western culture as a brief survey of the 
representation of Arabs in Western thought will illustrate. 
Beginnings of Islamic Threat Construction   
Shaheen (2003) quotes the Arabic proverb “Al tikrar biallem il hmar (By repetition even 
the donkey learns)” to discuss how the continuous portrayal of Islam as a major threat to all 
civilization has established it as a consistent evil (p. 171).  The Crusades mark the first time the 
West targeted Islam and acted in an effort to combat its spread.  Chevedden’s (2008) account of 
the Crusades references how 11th century “legal scholar and preacher at the Great Mosque of 
Damascus, ‘Ali ibn Tahrir al-Sulami .  .  .  presents the crusades as a Christian jihad against 
Islam” (p. 184).  Chevedden believes that Western scholars see the Islamic view of the Crusades 
“as ‘extraordinarily far-sighted and illuminating,’ abounding in ‘penetrating insights’ and 
offering ‘a wider view of historical processes,’” but refuse to recognize its information as 
academically valid (p. 187).  This degrading view of Islam persists despite the writings being 
verified as “historically accurate descriptions of crusading…that can be corroborated by papal 
documents” (p. 187).  The dismissal of Islamic history allows for many in the West to continue 
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believing that the crusades were ordained by God and conducted purely to protect Christians and 
the holy land.  However, this is not wholly true; one of the main factors contributing to the 
crusades was the ongoing conflict between the Latin West and Islamic East over land.  Islamic 
groups conquered large swaths of Christian land, which upset the Catholic Church.  Therefore, 
when the Latin West believed these groups could be successfully challenged, the Latin West 
seized the opportunity. 
Europeans in the 17th and 18th centuries also painted Islam as the Other and something to 
be feared.  Hammerbeck (2003) explains that, during this time, “Neoclassical and Enlightenment 
thought tended to discredit Islam, if not condemn it outright” (para. 3).  Islam has been 
characterized as attacking Christianity and Judaism, rather than as being just another religious 
option.  Muhammad has been demonized and constructed as a blood-thirsty devil who wants to 
destroy the world.  Bassoulini (2007) explains that the violent nature of Islam is purely contrived 
because the Qur’an prohibits “violence directed toward women, children, the elderly, the sick 
and wounded, clerics, and places of worship of Christianity and Judaism” (p. 135).  Wars that 
were waged in conquest and expansion were quite rare.  Bassoulini describes how, prior to 630 
CE, jihads were generally waged in self-defense. However, in 630 CE “the Prophet attacked 
Makkah. . . to take control of the Kaaba” and this was the war of conquest that other wars have 
used as their justification for jihad in the name of expansion (pp. 129-130). These wars of 
conquest and expansion, generally declared jihads, occurred “during Islam’s post-Prophet period 
and until the end of the Ottoman Empire after WWI” (p. 130) when they sharply declined in use.  
Despite knowing of this decline, thinkers in the West still considered Islam to be a direct 
challenge to the Christian way of life, and therefore the West’s power.  While the Ottoman 
Empire did expand into European territories and perpetrate many bloody massacres, it also 
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allowed the practice of other Abrahamic religions to continue as long as a tax was routinely paid 
(Bassoulini, 2007).  The Ottoman Empire did not desire to end Judaism or Christianity, just to 
expand its land and therefore possible economic and geographical power.  However, it must be 
noted that the Ottoman Empire was not one of pure goodness, it instilled fear in people around 
Europe because of its vicious actions when conquering new territory.  
Cinema also utilizes repetition as a teaching tool.  According to Shaheen (2003), “For 
more than a century Hollywood…had used repetition as a teaching tool, tutoring movie 
audiences by repeating over and over…insidious images of the Arab people” (p. 172).  Negative 
portrayals of Islam did not suddenly emerge after September 11, 2001, but rather they began in 
1896 (Shaheen).  Shaheen highlights that “filmmakers have collectively indicted all Arabs as 
Public Enemy #1 – brutal, heartless, uncivilized religious fanatics and money-mad cultural 
‘Others’ bent on terrorizing civilized Westerners, especially Christians and Jews” (p. 172).  The 
way in which Muslims have been portrayed can be likened to the way Native Americans in the 
United States were portrayed as savages, full of desire to rape the White woman and murder the 
White man.  In U.S. media, anyone from the Middle East is de facto a Muslim, and every 
Muslim is against everyone else, especially Christians.  This is especially true of Palestine, 
which has a stable, if not growing, Christian population.  The media portrays all inhabitants of 
Palestine as Muslim, but Felson and Schlesinger (2012) report that as of 2007 there were 51,710 
Christians in Palestine, or roughly 1.37% of the total population in Palestine was Christian (p. 9).  
Shaheen (2003) discusses how Hollywood has portrayed Arabs as “brute murderers, sleazy 
rapists, religious fanatics, oil-rich dimwits, and abusers of women” (p. 172).  Movies over the 
last century have shown sheiks laying around with harems of women, robbing other countries of 
their wealth through the sale of their country’s oil.  It would be easy to place the blame of these 
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images solely on Hollywood, to argue that Hollywood is, and has been, unregulated.  However, 
Hollywood is not allowed to run rampant and produce any movie it sees fit.  The U.S. Federal 
Government plays a role in approving and censoring movies.  Shaheen describes how:  
The government has a history of playing a role in what movies do and don’t get made.  
As early as 1917, the federal government not only acknowledged the power of film to 
influence political thought, it took on the wrongful role of censor.  As soon as the United 
States declared war on Germany, the government declared that no Hollywood movie 
could arouse prejudice against friendly nations.  (p. 190) 
The movie The Spirit of ’76, filmed in 1917, features “British soldiers committing acts of 
atrocity,” and it was brought in front a judge who ruled that, because England was a U.S. ally in 
the war and the film portrayed British soldiers negatively, it was obviously displaying “potent 
German propaganda” (p. 190).  As a result of the ruling, the director, Robert Goldstein, was 
imprisoned (Shaheen).  While the U.S. government has protected certain groups, Muslims and 
Arabs remain open for any depiction.  The DOD spoke out in the 1950s during the filming of 
The Bridge over the River Kwai (1957) and warned filmmakers to ensure not to unjustly portray 
Japanese villainy.    
Threat Construction after the Cold War 
Merskin (2009) notes that “after the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the end of 
the Cold War, America needed a new enemy, a global bad guy” (p. 165).  This new enemy 
became Islam.  Said (1997) describes how media and politicians equated all Arabs as Muslims 
and all Muslims as terrorists: “Fundamentalism equals Islam equals everything-we-must-now-
fight-against, as we did with communism during the Cold War” (p. xix).  The 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing created the necessary catalyst for increased media coverage of the “threat.” Said 
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documents how, after the bombing, “newspapers, magazines, and an occasional film . . . tried to 
inform the public about ‘the world of Islam’” as one full of hatred for the West (p. 16).  The 
State now had all it needed to clearly portray Islam as a threat to national security, and a threat 
that must be consistently monitored to ensure that American citizens remained safe.  This 
coverage continued through 1996, when “the Sunday New York Times ‘Week in Review’ 
headlined its January 21, 1996, issue with: ‘The Red Menace is Gone.  But Here’s Islam.’” (p. 
xix).  This demonstrates how Islam had become “one of the hottest, nastiest debates in academic 
circles” of the time, the “green menace,” was portrayed similar to the way the “Communist 
menace” had been portrayed (pp. xix-xx).  In three years Islam went from Hollywood screen 
villain to everyone’s nightmare.  The media assisted the State in inflating Islam’s threat through 
its coverage and inflammatory rhetoric.   
Not only was Islam demonized, it was also reduced to a singular entity.  Said (1997) 
discusses how depictions of “‘Islam’ seems to engulf all aspects of the diverse Muslim world, 
reducing them all to a special malevolent and unthinking essence” (p. 8).  If an individual lives in 
what is perceived to be the Middle East, they are immediately assumed to be Arab, Muslim, and 
a terrorist.  Said (1997) contends, “What we have…is a limited series of crude, essentialized 
caricatures of the Islamic world presented in such a way…to make that world vulnerable to 
military aggression” (p. 28).  While it is irrational to believe that reporters will spend their days 
ensuring that absolutely every fact they report is 100% true, the reductionist attitude toward 
Islam is a glaring problem.  Jahedi (2012) explains that “the U.S. media in particular tends to 
misrepresent the events happening in the world and marginalize dissent so as to allow the 
dominant interests to get their messages across to the public” (p. 60).  Much like Christianity, 
Islam is not one unified belief system; there are many different versions, sects, and 
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denominations that all claim to be Islamic.  Attempting to reduce Islam down to a singular 
definition in the U.S. media marginalizes all voices of difference within Islam. Threat 
construction is not unique to American media, but it is more pronounced in American media than 
in other countries.   
The marginalization of dissent to the possible Islamic threat has aided the U.S. in waging 
seventeen military missions in the Middle East between 1980 and 1995, “all of them directed 
against Muslims” (Huntington, 1996, p. 217).  The United States maintains a list of foreign states 
believed to be a threat to U.S. security.  In 1996, five of the seven states identified as terrorist 
states were located in the Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Sudan (Huntington, 1996).  
Recently, the U.S. Department of State (2016) reduced the number to three total states: Iran, 
Sudan, and Syria.  The West and Islam have been in constant turmoil.  However, it is not just the 
U.S. versus Islam.  Huntington (1996) explains that “50 percent of wars involving pairs of states 
of different religions between 1820 and 1929 were wars between Muslims and Christians” (p. 
210).  Taking action based on a perceived threat from Islam is not new; rather, this threat has 
been constructed and reinforced for centuries.   
Threat Construction During the Second Bush Administration 
In the case of the invasion of Iraq, the 2001 Bush administration “introduced the new 
issue of potential direct Iraqi attack on the United States” (Kauffman, 2004, p. 36) to undermine 
the belief that Iraq could easily be contained.  George H. W. Bush primed the American public to 
view Iraq as a threat through his war on Iraq to “save” Kuwait.  Winkler (1991) explores how 
during the Reagan administration Bush served as the head of the Task Force on Combatting 
Terrorism and notes Bush’s differentiation between a freedom fighter and terrorist (pp. 121-122).  
Bush depicts terrorists as individuals who “deliberately target non-combatants for their own 
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cynical purposes” while the freedom fighter seeks “to adhere to international law and civilized 
standards of conduct. They attack military targets, not defenseless civilians” (p. 122).  Bush’s 
distinctions allowed for him to easily paint Iraq as a country of terrorists that were preying on the 
civilians of Kuwait (Winkler, 1991).  He (1991) called the world to action claiming that “in the 
more than 5 months since August 2d, Iraqi troops have carried out a systemic campaign of terror 
on the people of Kuwait” (para. 3).  Bush’s priming of the Iraq terrorists combined with a lack of 
coverage regarding Iraq since the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War allowed the media and 
State to easily manipulate information because voters were not very knowledgeable of the issues.   
Kauffman posits that the Bush administration was easily able to manipulate the issue of 
Iraq “in part because the ordinary human tendency toward patriotism makes it too hard to 
publicly defend the proposition that foreign opponents may not have hostile intentions or may be 
justified in some of their actions” (p. 36).  In a country that had just lost thousands of individuals 
to a sudden and horrific attack, the public was easily convinced of the possibility that their 
enemies were hiding in multiple locations.  The case of Iraq was also manipulated very easily 
because the Democrats were split, some supporting containment and others supporting the idea 
of invasion.  The faction that supported containment, however, was not strong enough to carry 
the rest of the party and oppose the war efforts.  Thus, the attacks on September 11, 2001, 
provided the catalyst necessary to change the dialogue around Iraq from containment to 
countering terrorism.   
The Bush administration used its ability to classify information to aid the shaping of 
public opinion.  Restricted access to information regarding wars began with the Reagan 
administration’s invasion of Grenada.  Campbell (1989) states that “the government had 
deliberately made no plans for the media to be on hand to report the Grenada invasion” and that 
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when originally submitted “it called for the exclusion of the press during the invasion and initial 
fighting” (p. 1).  What was attempted to be explained away as the White House looking out for 
the safety of the journalists and desiring complete surprise in the invasion was quickly 
questioned by journalists and the public.  Campbell explains that even journalists who attempted 
to access the island on private boats or take pictures from neighboring Barbados were harassed 
or detained for days to avoid their information reaching Stateside.  However, much of the public 
outcry ceased as soon as the journalists were allowed onto the island after the initial invasion was 
completed (Campbell, 1989).  While there is no formal legislation or ruling that prohibits 
journalists from knowing about military or governmental action, Campbell highlights that 
“media organizations are reluctant to pursue the issue through the courts.  They reason that if the 
court does not rule in the media’s favor, the decision could set a harmful precedent in future 
cases concerning access to government activities” (p. 61).  Despite the lack of legal precedent 
that allows the White House to regulate correspondence with and through the mass media, 
Reagan set the stage to highly restrict information regarding military activities and subsequent 
presidents have taken advantage of this.  Following the fall of the Twin Towers on September 
11, 2001, “the government was soon able to establish the frames and the agendas according to 
which the unfolding story was generally reported. . . .  Most media, stunned by the events of the 
day, seemed all too willing to accept the government’s lead” (Karim, 2006, p. 125).  Government 
influence over the Islamic threat quickly took hold on September 11 and continues to shape the 
frames today. 
The construction of the 2002 Iraqi threat was accomplished “through selective release—
or suppression—of analyses and information” (Kaufman, 2004, p. 37).  The Bush administration 
classified any information that was contradictory to their claims, while simultaneously 
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publicizing all of the information that supported their claims.  News channels, willingly or 
unwillingly, favored individuals that supported inflated claims about the threat that Iraq truly 
posed.  Kauffman conducted a study of 393 television news programs that covered the Iraq war 
during a two-week period from January to February 2003 and uncovered that more than half of 
those quoted were U.S. officials and that “only 17 percent of sources quoted expressed 
skepticism about administration policy…Only 4 percent were skeptical expressions by 
Americans, and only half of these had any affiliation to advocacy or expert organizations” (p. 
44).  While a few individuals attempted to speak out against the administration, they were 
quickly buried under all of the other voices that were clamoring for a spot on the air or in print to 
support Bush’s efforts to protect Americans.  This is also compounded by Kauffman’s findings 
that “during the war, many journalists signed agreements allowing the military to vet their 
stories” (p. 45).  Furthermore, news surrounding the War on Terror completely disregards “the 
violence committed by the USA” and “excludes the terrorism carried out by various groups in 
countries such as Ireland, Spain, and Sri Lanka” (Karim, 2006, p. 126).  While the impacts of the 
attempted censorship on the content reported cannot be verified, it is unlikely that anything that 
was highly critical of efforts war was not allowed through to the general public. 
The movie Rules of Engagement, released in 2000, was the first movie that showed U.S. 
marines opening fire on civilians.  Shaheen (2003) explains that, except in a few cases, “no 
Hollywood WWI, WWII, or Korean War movie has ever shown America’s fighting forces 
slaughtering children.  Yet,…U.S. marines open fire on the Yemenis, shooting 83 men, women, 
and children.  During the scene, viewers rose to their feet, clapped and cheered” (p. 177).  
Shaheen’s analysis does not include films such as Platoon, but the depiction of the violent 
Muslim continues into the 21st century.  Arabs, including those that are defenseless, have been 
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painted as an opponent that must be vanquished.  The fact that individuals rose to their feet to 
applaud this fictitious war crime outlines how clearly cemented the threat of Islam is in the 
populace’s collective consciousness.   
In addition to the slaughter scene, the credits for Rules of Engagement thank the DOD 
and the U.S. Marines Corp for their assistance in making the film possible.  However, Rules of 
Engagement is not the only film that thanks the armed services and the DOD for their 
contributions.  Shaheen (2003) states that “more than fourteen feature films, all of which show 
Americans killing Arabs, credit the DOD for providing needed equipment, personnel, and 
technical assistance” (p. 177).  By continuing to provide support for films that incorporate the 
military in some aspect, the DOD attempts to control the portrayal of the U.S. military, thus 
ensuring that the perception of an Islamic threat continues through their assistance to Hollywood. 
Film and television do not operate in a vacuum; single-text readings often fail to produce 
an understanding of the global nature of media (Landy, 1994).  Landy explains that “media are 
part of a global network that constantly and often arbitrarily constructs conceptions of the local 
and international, the center and margin” (p. 11).  Media texts should not be described as 
singularly “utopian or dystopian” because that tends to ignore the way in which the texts, “like 
common sense, [are] comprised of numerous sediments that appear to fuse the local and national, 
national and international, private and public, and past and present” (p. 11).  The media provide 
the medium through which the hegemon can reproduce “itself through the institutions and 
through the attitudes and behavior of individuals and social groups” (p. 25).  Subaltern consent is 
acquired through many avenues, the mass media being one of the driving forces of it.  
Hollywood is not the only reinforcer of this threat.  Rosas-Moreno, Harp, and Bachmann 
(2013) examined the covers of Time magazine during the War with Iraq and discovered that, “in 
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line with past research on war news, the cover texts favored a dichotomous discourse that clearly 
opposed ‘us’ from ‘them’” and that “it was ‘they’ with their religious sectarianism who sowed 
terror in the country” (p. 11).  American soldiers were highlighted as liberators of a country that 
was mired in terror and lacked a rule of law.  Additionally, Iraqi citizens were not portrayed as 
innocent civilians, but rather as a group of Muslims only interested in destroying the United 
States.  Had the U.S. delayed action, or not taken any action, there was a representation of a clear 
threat that these “blood thirsty” individuals would have attacked U.S. civilians.  When Time did 
feature Iraqis on the cover it was not as “victims of an armed conflict,” but rather they were 
portrayed as “angry radical Muslims” (p. 11).  The women and children that lost access to clean 
water and food and that were suddenly subjected to a war zone were hidden from the cover of the 
magazine in favor of showing the men and portraying them as anti-American.  Time magazine 
only portrayed the Iraqi population as “secretive and dangerous – ‘the hidden enemy’ – and 
conjured up notions of terrorism” and encouraged the American public that “‘we’ should beware 
of such people” (p. 11).  Time magazine perpetuated the idea that all Muslims and Arabs were 
against the United States and that all action necessary must be taken in order to secure U.S. 
territory. 
Continued Coverage of Islam 
Constructing Islam as a threat continues today.  Nightly news programs regularly cover 
the threat Islam poses to Americans.  Hundreds of journal articles and books have been written 
about the Islamic threat, and many pieces of legislation, such as The Patriot Act, have been 
passed in response to this “threat.”  Trevino, Kanso, and Nelson (2010) suggest that “media 
exposure is essential to the existence of terrorism” (p. 6).  Islam is essentialized into a single 
monstrous and violent entity, instead of being recognized as diverse as any other religion.  Some 
52 
 
media outlets have even resorted to labeling Islam as “radical” in an effort to set it apart from 
other Abrahamic religions.  Ann Coulter (2016), famous conservative, has gone as far as to 
equate all Muslims as terrorists when she proclaimed that “Muslims keep blowing things up and 
shooting people” (para 1).  Western media has not seen a decrease in vicious language aimed at 
otherizing Islam, rather only a continuation of what has been. 
Brigitte Gabriel is founder of the conservative group American Israel Political Affairs 
Committee, formerly ACT! For America, and speaks about the threat from “radical Islam” (Belt, 
2016).  At the Intelligence Summit in Washington, D.C., Gabriel (2006) pronounced that 
“America and the West are doomed to failure in this war unless they stand up and identify the 
real enemy. Islam” (para. 6).  Throughout her condemnation of Islam and pleas for the U.S. to 
increase efforts against all Muslims she often referred to the “vile” nature of Muslims, warning 
that “the radical Islamists’ deeds have been as vile as their words” (para. 10).  Gabriel is 
convinced that there is no such thing as a “good Muslim” and believes that the U.S. should be 
doing everything in its power to eradicate the religion and its followers.  Gabriel is not alone; 
during the 2010 midterm elections Newt Gingrich “produced a film with his wife on the 
existential threat of Islamization, America at Risk: The War With No Name” (Belt, 2016, p. 217).  
Throughout the film, Gingrich warns viewers of the dangerous, “radical Islamists” that are 
plotting against America.  Conservative media, from radio talk-shows to print news, consistently 
advances the narrative that Islam is out to take over the world and Muslims are actively 
conspiring to implement Sharia law in the U.S. (Belt, 2016).  Belt (2016) highlights that 
thousands of articles and broadcast media with conservative tendencies all continue to tout the 
claim that America is unsafe, fueling the hegemonic perspective that military action to keep 
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America safe is the only option.  A common way to further the notion of the radical Muslim is to 
target countries that are considered to be predominantly Muslim. 
Iran’s history and involvement with attacks against non-Muslim countries has been 
consistently inflated by the U.S. media.  Jahedi (2012) explains that, “although it was not proven 
conclusively that Iran aimed to make nuclear weapons,. . .attempts were made to portray Iran as 
a nuclear threat” (p. 63).  Additionally, Iran has been declared a sponsor of terror by U.S. news 
media and U.S. government through headlines that alleged Iran supported Osama bin-Laden and 
Shia insurgents during the 21st century Iraq War (Jahedi).  The active threat inflation of Iran is 
clearly explained by Jahedi when he states that “the role of the U.S. press in particular has done 
little to assuage American fears; on the contrary, it probably served to (re)produce those very 
fears in the construction of Iran as the evil, recalcitrant Other” (p. 64).  There is no sign that this 
message is changing, or that many are even concerned about the possible repercussions to the 
continuing casting of Islam as the ultimate threat to the West. 
Hypotheses and Research Questions 
The media set the agenda, frame the story, and prime the audience to feel a specific way.  
Understanding the extent to which the media are able to create a reality is vital to uncovering 
how involved the hegemon is in creating the reality that best suits them. Theorists have begun to 
apply cultivation theory to stereotypes of individuals perceived to be from other countries and 
the life of the foreigner (Hughes & Baldwin, 2002; Vergeer, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2000; 
Weiman, 2000; Zhang, 2010).  Based on the general principles of cultivation theory above, it is 
expected that heavy viewers of television news will be related to an increase in stereotypes, due 
both to the mainstreaming effect of media bringing viewers to a homogenized media reality and 
to the resonance of recent coverage of news events in the Middle East.  Agreement to statements 
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from the Qur’an and from Muslim individuals about their faith will be negatively related to 
amount of mass media consumed.  The first hypothesis examined stereotypes of Islam, Muslims, 
and the Qur’an together and then H1a-H1c looks at each case individually. Thus, the first 
hypothesis is: 
H1: The salience of an individual’s stereotypes of Islam, Muslims, and the Qur’an will be 
greater for heavy users of media than for light users of media. 
H1a: The salience of an individual’s stereotypes of Islam will be greater for heavy users 
of media than for light users of media.  
H1b: The salience of an individual’s stereotypes of Muslims will be greater for heavy 
users of media than for light users of media. 
H1c: The salience of an individual’s stereotypes of the Qur’an will be greater for heavy 
users of media than for light users of media.  
Hetsroni (2010) argues that “questions about a foreign land yield a stronger cultivation 
effect compared to questions about the home country” (p. 442).  A lack of contact with foreign 
lands results in individuals having little knowledge base to which they can compare information 
they have gathered on their own and information they gather from mass news media.  Hetsroni 
suggests that this may be because,  
when the questions pertain to a distant culture about which they [audience members] 
have no first hand acquaintance, they undergo experiential remoteness, which facilitates 
the activation of cognitive shortcuts, the retrieval of media exemplars without reference 
to their source, and eventually a stronger cultivation effect.  (p. 442)  
Hetsroni explains that when media consumers are less knowledgeable on a subject, the 
individuals are more likely to accept the news’ portrayal as accurate on-face.  H3 examined the 
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Qur’an and Muslim statements together and H3a-H3b examined each individual case. Hetsroni’s 
line of analysis informs the hypothesises that: 
H2: Personal exposure to Muslims will be negatively related to the acceptance of positive 
statements of Islam, Muslims, and the Qur’an portrayed in mass media. 
H3: Personal exposure to Muslims will be positively related to agreement with statements 
from both the Qur’an and from Muslims. 
H3a: Personal exposure to Muslims will be positively related to agreement with 
statements from the Qur’an. 
H3b: Personal exposure to Muslims will be positively related to agreement with 
statements from Muslims. 
Hetsroni also discovered that frequency is more important that recency.  Hetsroni concluded that 
recency will not override frequency if there is a sudden shift instead of a gradual shift. 
Frequency’s ability to override recency provides insight into why the occasional change in story 
will not eliminate the negative notions already held by viewers.  Recency is not enough to 
replace the cognitive shortcuts that have been cultivated in a viewer over an extended period of 
time; repetition of the new story will take a long time to override long held beliefs.  The idea that 
recency and frequency are important in the creation of personal perceptions informs the research 
question: 
RQ1: Is contact with Muslims a better predictor of levels of salience of stereotypes than 
the level of media consumption? 
Furthermore, Hetsroni believes that attempts to quickly change the image of a nation, group, or 
country are even more difficult, especially if the group is not well known.  Specific to the present 
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study, positive portrayals of Muslims will not likely resonate with heavy news media consumers 
since changing narratives about the Other does not occur easily. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined how those in power utilize that power to ensure their 
hegemonic position.  Additionally, the rhetoric endorsed by the hegemon ultimately makes its 
way into the media and aids in creating a cohesive message to be disseminated through various 
different media.  The media’s explicit, or implicit, approval of the hegemon’s message has led to 
an entire region of the world and major religion being blamed for major atrocities.  Exploration 
into how salient the message of the Islamic threat is with the public is essential in understanding 
the media’s ability to set the public perception of domestic and foreign policy. Thus, this chapter 
built an argument for an analysis of the cultivating effect of media exposure on audience’s 
perceptions of Islam and Muslims. The next chapter will explain the method used to conduct this 
study. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODS 
The previous chapters explore the problem with Islamophobia and the history of how 
Islam and the Middle East have been vilified for over two centuries.  The stereotype of the 
greedy scoundrel that lives off of oil sales to the West and is surrounded by a harem of women is 
one that has been cultivated through all of mass media.  The ever increasing numbers of Middle 
Eastern refugees indicates how the West and the East are bound to become more intertwined.  
This chapter will explain the methods through which data was collected and analyzed.  While the 
cultivation effect does not alone establish direct causal links between Islamophobia and media 
consumption, it could provide a strong correlative link.  Combining different types of media 
consumption to create a clearer media profile of respondents could aid in creating a stronger link 
between media consumption and Islamophobia.  Accounting for personal exposure to Muslims 
will also assist in establishing the strength of the media in creating beliefs that are contradictory 
to texts and teachings of societies that are not well known to a certain group. 
Participants and Procedures 
One hundred twelve participants from around the world volunteered to take the online 
survey.  The participants had a variety of ages, ethnicities, and backgrounds. Participants were 
recruited from a data collection website associated with the department of communication at a 
midsized U.S. university, as well as from students from the university at large who have agreed 
to take surveys, from my personal Facebook account, and from Reddit.  The study also generated 
participants through snowball recruitment.   
After logging in to the survey, participants were presented with an informed consent 
statement and, after agreeing to participate and verifying they are 18 years of age or older, 
proceeded to the first page of the survey.  Participants remained anonymous, as IP addresses 
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were not collected, nor was any question asked that could distinguish participants from one 
another. 
Survey 
Each survey consisted of basic demographic questions, a measure of presentation bias, a 
measure of acceptance of cultural differences, and a measure of feelings toward Muslims, Islam, 
and the Qur’an.  Presentation bias was measured using a Likert scale from 1 (never) to 5 
(always).  The measures for the acceptance of cultural differences and feelings toward Islam, 
Muslims, and the Qur’an utilized a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).   
Demographics   
Participants were asked to report the gender with which they identify, their age in years, 
nationality, and highest level of achieved education.  The participants were comprised of 66 
females (59%), 45 males (40%), and 1 participant reported as omni-gendered (1%).  Participants’ 
ages ranged from 18 to 75 years of age with a mean of 32 years of age.  The backgrounds 
reported were 98 North American (88%), 1 Canadian (1%), 4 Western European (4%), 2 Asian 
(2%), 1 African/Sub-Saharan (1%), 2 Middle Eastern (2%), and 4 Other (4%).  The highest 
educational level achieved ranged from grade school to a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), with the 
mean of a Bachelor’s degree.  
Islamophobia Scale 
Lee et al.  (2009) created the Islamophobia scale by creating “a pool of 41 items [that] 
was generated based on fear and literature on Islamophobic sentiment” (p. 96).  These 41 items 
were then combined with items from Gonzalez et al.’s (2008) symbolic threat measurement, 
responses from a previous study conducted by the present researcher that explored how Muslims 
interpreted their own religion, themes from the Qur’an, and statements from interviews 
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conducted by Moezzi (2007) exploring the stories of Muslims with many different backgrounds.  
These items will be evaluated on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to 
“strongly agree” (7).  Gonzalez et al.  (2008) report that Cronbach’s α for the symbolic threat 
measurement was .89.  There are no reliabilities reported for the other measures that constitute 
this scale. Thirteen items were reverse scored before a sum of all the items was made. Then, the 
full Islamophobia scale was broken into three separate measures to look specifically at fear of 
Islam, Muslims, and the Quran and divided by the total number of items per variable. The fear of 
Muslims measure was reliable with a Cronbach’s α of .87.  The fear of the Qur’an measure 
approached reliability with a Cronbach’s α of .78.  The fear of Islam measure was reliable with a 
Cronbach’s α of .93.    
Intergroup Contact 
Intergroup contact was measured through three items: “How often do you have contact 
with those you perceive to be Muslims at work or school?”; “How often do you have contact 
with those you perceive to be Muslims in your neighborhood?” and “How often do you have 
contact with those you perceive to be Muslims somewhere else, for example clubs?”  The scale 
derives from a four-item measure from Gonzalez, Verkuyten, Weesie, and Poppe (2008), who 
reported a Cronbach’s α of .70 for the original instrument.  The three items will be evaluated on 
a 5-point scale, ranging from “never” (1) to “always” (5), such that a higher score indicates 
increased contact with Muslims.   
Cultural Sensitivity Presentation Bias 
Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, and Timani (2009) developed the cultural sensitivity 
presentation bias scale to evaluate “the extent to which a person engages in culturally sensitive 
behaviors that cannot truthfully be adhered to at all times” (p. 96).  Lee et al. argue that there is a 
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tendency for individuals to falsely report that they are more culturally sensitive than they really 
are so as to give the impression they are extremely aware and responsive to minority issues.  
However, they believe that “an extreme affinity for minority issues is rare in the context of U.S. 
racial relations” (p. 96).  This study utilized the cultural sensitivity bias scale to attempt to 
account for respondents reporting more favorable views of Islam and/or Muslims than may be 
actually true.  Cultural sensitivity presentation bias is related to Strahan and Gerbasi’s (1971) 
social desirability scale, but remains unique because of its focus on race relations.  For example, 
the statement “I never made fun of the way people from other countries lived” is unlikely to be 
true at all times because there is no such absolute consistency in an individual’s entire life.  For 
the purpose of this study, the scale has been changed from a forced answer true or false to a 5 
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (always).  The scale consists of ten statements that 
have been altered from Lee et al.’s (2009) study.  Lee et al.  explain that “high scores on the CS 
indicate high presentation bias tendencies in the domain of cultural sensitivity” (p. 96). Seven 
items were reverse scored before a sum for all items was created. 
Stereotypes 
Stereotypes were measured using a semantic differential.  Seventeen trait adjectives were 
rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from a positive adjective (1) to a negative adjective (7).  A 
higher score indicated more negative stereotypes for Muslims.  Six items were reversed scored 
before a sum of all items was created. 
Media Usage 
Participants indicated the total hours of media consumed weekly, total hours of television 
media by category, total hours of music videos by category, and total hours of films by category.  
Exposure to music videos (in total hours) by category was analyzed because of the rising number 
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of Muslim music artists producing music videos.  Each category of media was broken up into 
quartiles for total hours to represent light (1) and heavy (4) viewers.  Total media’s 1st quartile 
was 0 to 14 hours and the 4th quartile was greater than or equal to 40 hours.  Total television 
media’s 1st quartile was 0 to 7 hours and the 4th quartile was greater than or equal to 24 hours.  
Total film media’s 1st quartile was 0 to .99 hours and the 4th quartile was greater than or equal to 
10 hours.  Total music video’s 1st quartile was 0-.19 hours and the 4th quartile was greater than or 
equal to 1.07 hours.  Participants also answered whether they obtained their news from nine 
different television and social media sources, such as Fox News, MSNBC, or Facebook.  The 
answer to each source was a forced Yes or No.  
Procedure 
Each participant logged into the online survey located on Select Survey, an online 
survey-delivery software program supported by the researcher’s university.  After participants 
consented to participating and being 18 years or older they proceeded to the survey.  The 
participants proceeded through the survey, which took 10 to 20 minutes to complete.   
Data Analysis 
To evaluate the internal validity of each variable Crohnbach’s α were conducted.  
Following that, the items were added together to create single scores for perceptions of Islam, 
Muslims, and the Qur’an.  T-tests evaluated H1a through H1c.  A correlation analysis was used 
to test H2 and H3.  These tests allow for a correlation between Islamophobia and media 
consumption to be clearly established.  Breaking media consumption into different categories 
allows for t-tests to evaluate to what degree certain media influences Islamophobia.  The 
correlation analysis will also allow for an examination of the degree to which personal exposure 
mediates the media’s influence on Islamophobia. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explained how data were gathered and analyzed in an attempt to 
establish a strong correlation between negative media portrayals and personal levels of 
Islamophobia.  Analysis of multiple forms of mass media and perceptions of Islam and the 
Middle East could provide the insights into the power the mass media wields over public 
understanding.  The next chapter will report the results of the responses. 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
The previous chapters explored the problem of how the mass media stereotype Muslims 
as a great threat.  There are a lot of groups acting together, such as politicians and news media, in 
order to create a unified image of a group that is focused on causing as much pain and chaos as 
possible.  The process for gathering data was also explained.  Participants were recruited through 
various means and asked to rank a series of statements on a Likert-type scale in an attempt to 
establish a link between amount of mass media consumed and levels of acceptance of stereotypes 
of Islam, Muslims, and/or the Qur’an.  This chapter reports and interprets the findings of the 
study. 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that agreement with negative sentiment would be higher for heavy 
viewers than for light viewers.  The stereotypes measure reported reliability with a Cronbach’s α 
of .93.  The mean score for stereotypes was 3.05 (SD= .98, range 2.57 to 3.55), indicating that 
participants mostly agreed with the positive descriptors of traits provided.  The mean for 
prejudice of Muslims was 2.34 (SD= .76), indicating general disagreement with negative 
statements regarding Muslims and general agreement with positive statements regarding 
Muslims.  The mean for prejudice towards the Qur’an was 3.33 (SD= 1.12), indicating a general 
disagreement with negative statements regarding the Qur’an and agreement with positive 
statements.  The mean for prejudice of Islam was 2.90 (SD= 1.23), indicating a general 
disagreement with negative statements about Islam and agreement with positive statements.  
The participants reported a mean of 30.25 hours of total media consumed during 
an average week (SD= 24.11).  The range was 113 hours/week, with a minimum of 2 hours and a 
maximum of 115 hours.  There were 25 participants that were low consumers of media and 31 
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participants that were high consumers of media.  The sub-group of total television media 
watched on an average week had a mean of 17.90 hours (SD= 14.88).  The range for total hours 
of television was 70 hours, with a minimum of 0 hours and a maximum of 70 hours/week.  The 
sub-group of total film watched on an average week had a mean of 6.59 hours (SD= 7.16).  Film-
viewing totals ranged from of 0 to 45 hours.  The sub-group of total hours of music videos 
watched during an average week had a mean of 3.54 hours (SD= 9.54).  The range for total hours 
of music videos watched was 60 hours, with a minimum of 0 hours and a maximum of 60 hours.  
Participants answered Yes or No to a list of possible news sources.  These nine sources 
were chosen because they are perceived to be the major news networks and most common social 
media outlets.  The results are reported in Table 1, based on the number of respondents per item.  
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  Table 1 
Source of News: Percentages   
News Source Yes No 
Fox News 20 80 
MSNBC 40 60 
CNN 51 50 
Local News Station 65 35 
Tumbler 8 92 
Instagram 8 92 
Reddit 33 67 
Twitter 35 65 
Facebook 64 36 
 
 
Total media consumed did not significantly correlate to prejudice of Muslims, the 
Qur’an, or Islam. A Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated for the relationship between 
participants’ average total weekly media consumption and fear of Muslims, the Qur’an, and 
Islam independently. A weak correlation that was not significant was found for Muslims (r (96) 
= .02, p > .05).  A weak correlation that was not significant was found for the Qur’an (r (107) = -
.09, p > .05).  A weak correlation that was not significant was also found for Islam (r (104) = -
.04, p > .05).  There was a strong correlation between all the stereotypes, the higher acceptance 
for one positively correlated to a higher acceptance for another category.  The results for the 
correlations are reported in Table 3 below. 
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Independent-samples t tests were run comparing the mean scores of heavy and light 
viewers and levels of fear of Muslims, the Qur’an, and Islam.  No significant difference between 
the mean scores of heavy and light viewers was found for any of the pairs. The results for all 
independent-samples t tests are reported in Table 2.  
 
 
  Table 2 
Independent-Samples Test    
 m (sd) t df 
Muslim prejudice        1 
                                    4 
2.49 (.78) 
2.37 (.94) 
.473 47 
Qur’an prejudice         1 
                                    4 
3.71 (.88) 
3.21 (1.12) 
1.83 53 
Islamic prejudice        1 
                                    4 
3.29 (1.19) 
2.77 (1.23) 
1.59 52 
Note: 1 = light viewers (range 0 to 7 hours of TV/week); 4 = heavy viewers (≥ 25 hours of 
TV/week) 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 and 3 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that personal exposure to Muslims would reduce agreement with 
negative sentiments.  Hypothesis 3 predicted that personal exposure to Muslims would increase 
agreement with positive sentiments.  Intergroup contact was reliable with a Cronbach’s α of .80.  
The intergroup contact mean was 7.6 (SD= 2.86).  The results indicate that the majority of 
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respondents have contact with an individual they perceive to be Muslim.  A Pearson correlation 
coefficient was calculated for the relationship between participants’ intergroup contact and 
salience of stereotypes.  A negative correlation was found (r (101) = -.18, p < .05), indicating a 
significant linear relationship between the two variables.  The more contact a participant had 
with those they perceive to be Muslim, the less salient negative statements of Muslims, Islam, 
and the Qur’an were for the participant.  The results for the correlation analysis is reported in 
Table 3.  
 
 
  Table 3 
Pearson Correlation         
 Muslim 
prejudice 
 Qur’an 
prejudice 
 Islamic 
prejudice 
 Intergroup 
Contact 
 
Intergroup Contact -.131  -.185*  -.232**  1  
Muslim prejudice 1  .498**  .740**  -.131  
Qur’an prejudice .498**  1  .831**  -.185*  
Islamic prejudice .740**  .831**  1  -.232**  
Note: * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed) and ** Correlation is significant at the 
.01 level (1-tailed). 
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Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 asks if intergroup contact is a better predictor of prejudice than 
consumption of media.  It was found that intergroup contact did result in a negative correlation 
with agreement of negative perceptions.  To examine further, a multiple linear regression was 
conducted to evaluate respondents’ Islamic prejudice based on their intergroup contact and 
presentation bias. A significant regression equation was found (F(2, 100) = 17.40, p < .001), with 
an R2 of .26.  Respondents predicted level of Islamic prejudice is equal to 1.00 -.07(Intergroup 
contact) + .11(Presentation bias).  Presentation bias was a significant predictor for the multiple 
linear regression while intergroup contact was not a significant predictor. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explained the results of the study.  The results show that there is no 
significant relationship between the hours of media consumed and levels of fear of Islam, 
Muslims, or the Qur’an.  There was a significant negative correlative relationship between higher 
intergroup contact and levels of fear of Islam.  The following chapter will discuss the findings 
and the implications they could hold for future research. 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
The previous chapter provides the results from the study.  While no significant 
correlation between media consumption and levels of fear was found, the results still provide 
insights into the relationship between media, politics, and threat construction.  Future research 
could also build off of this study and expand upon the theories of cultivation and limited effects.  
Summary of Findings 
Overall the results of this study failed to establish a strong correlation between an 
increased consumption of media and fear of Muslims, the Qur’an, and Islam.  However, there 
was a strong negative correlation between intergroup contact and salience of stereotypes.  This 
chapter will explore the possible implications the results offer.  While there is no strong 
correlative link between increased media consumption and fears, there are unique implications 
regarding the cultivation effect and general Islamophobia.   
While there was no strong correlation found between consumption of media and the level 
of salience of stereotypes and general Islamophobia, the amount of rhetoric that is in the mass 
media creating the Islamic threat cannot be denied.  Various entities have been promoting the 
fear of Muslims and Islam for centuries (Weimann, 2000; Shaheen, 2003; Brinson, 2011; Naji & 
Iwar, 2013).  Presidents have been nurturing an American fear of the Other for decades, and, 
since the 1990s, Islam has been the target of political ire (Said, 1997; Karim, 2006).  While the 
participants did not report a high affinity for negative statements about Muslims, the Qur’an, or 
Islam, the responses indicate acceptance of positive statements and a rejection of negative 
statements.  While it cannot be concluded that the mass media have any impact on the cultivation 
of Islamophobia, it also cannot be completely dismissed. 
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Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis one predicted that the salience of stereotypes would be greater for heavy 
viewers of media than it would for light viewers of media.  Contrary to what was expected, 
media consumption did not have any significant effect on the participants’ fear of Islam, 
Muslims, or the Qur’an.  While these findings are inconsistent with the theory of cultivation, it is 
consistent with the critiques of cultivation.  Potter (2014) explains that while the cultivation 
effect has been applied to research since the 1970s, examination of those writings for 
“completeness and relevance” leaves cultivation critics desiring a more comprehensive review of 
the literature (p. 1024).  This study attempted to complete a more comprehensive examination of 
the cultivation effect, the results did not support the hypothesis.  Potter believes there are gaps in 
the cultivation literature regarding such things as the type of media studied or possible mediating 
variables between media usage and cultivation effects.  Potter also argues that “reviews are 
largely descriptive inventories of a growing list of topics, rather than a careful sorting through 
the findings to identify meanings” (emphasis in original, p. 1025).  This study examined a 
number of types of mass media in an attempt to account for various different effects, but the 
results only further support the critics of cultivation rather than providing a clearer defense of 
cultivation’s effect. 
Specifically, this study attempted to look at the relationship between mass media 
consumption and agreement with negative statements about Muslims, the Qur’an, and Islam, but 
the results were not significant.  The aggregate total of all media consumed during an average 
week did not approach significance in correlation to any of these variables, thus suggesting no 
link between media usage and general Islamophobia.  As discussed earlier, previous studies have 
measured levels of Islamophobia in differing publics and the amount of coverage in the mass 
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media of the “Islamic threat.”  However, no study attempting to link the mass media to 
Islamophobia through the cultivation effect has been attempted.   
Other critiques of media-effects research revolve around the use of self-reporting.  
Valkenburg and Peter (2013) believe that “self-reported media exposure is inherently threatened 
to be inaccurate due to cognitive reasons, shortcomings in information processing have led to 
imprecise reporting” and “differences in people’s motivations to report about, or engage in, a 
particular topic lead to differential reporting about exposure to the topic” (p. 200).  When 
individuals are aware of the purpose of a study, there is a chance that presentation bias will 
interfere with accurate reporting.  The multiple linear regression ran for RQ1 shows that 
presentation bias is significantly related to levels of acceptance of statements, which may 
positively skew the results.  While it cannot be concluded that participants reported more 
favorably about themselves in all instances, presentation bias did affect responses.  Presentation 
bias does not support the conclusion that the mass media affects perceptions of Islam, Muslims, 
or the Qur’an; but complete rejection of the hypothesis would be unwise.  The extent of the 
negative images infiltrating most forms of the mass media does have some effect on a society’s 
collective memory and common sense.  The American government is clearly attempting to 
persuade its citizens, and citizens of the world, that military actions taken by the U.S. military are 
just and only conducted to maintain security of civilians (Merskin, 2009).  American politicians 
and mass media conglomerates understand the power that they can wield over the publics and are 
not going to reduce their efforts any time soon, even if studies do not fully confirm that their 
efforts are fruitful. 
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Hypothesis 2 and 3 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that personal exposure to Muslims would be negatively related to 
the salience of stereotypes portrayed in the mass media and H3 predicted that there would be a 
positive relationship between an increased intergroup contact and positive perceptions. As 
expected, as intergroup contact with perceived Muslims increased acceptance of negative 
statements decreased.  While there are critiques of intergroup contact, Hewstone (2015) explains 
that “contact. . . affects prejudice on a macro-level, whereby people are influenced by the 
behavior of others in their social context” (p. 431).  Contact is not the only predictor of reduced 
acceptance of prejudice, the diversity of an individual’s living space also affects acceptance of 
prejudice (Hewstone).  The findings of this study support both conclusions; the more interaction 
in an individual’s neighborhood and daily life the less agreement with negative statements were 
accepted and increase in agreement with positive statements.  These findings are also consistent 
with Gonzalez et al.’s (2008) findings and reinforce their findings that intergroup contact is a 
predictor of acceptance of stereotypes.  At the same time, it is important to remember that this 
study does not establish a causal link, but rather just a correlative one.   
Past research has also established that the more varied and continued exposure to a 
different group the increased likelihood of success in reducing acceptance of stereotypes 
(Pettigrew, 1998).  The results of this study support Pettigrew’s findings, since the survey asked 
for the respondent to report on their daily interaction with those they perceive to be Muslim.  
Rather than just asking for overall interaction, this study asked for daily interaction to provide 
further evidence that the duration of interaction with another group is also important in reducing 
prejudice.  Tawagi and Mak (2015) explain that the quality of contact and the context is 
important for increasing positive sentiments towards a group.  Duration and location are not the 
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only impacts on intergroup acceptance.  This study did not ask for how positive or negative 
interactions with perceived Muslims were; addition of this question in future studies could 
further intergroup contact research. 
Research Question 1 
 Research question one asked if contact with Muslims was a better predictor of salience of 
stereotypes than the level of an individual’s media consumption.  Findings suggest that the 
answer to this is yes.  Intergroup contact was significantly negatively related to the acceptance of 
stereotypes, whereas, media consumption had no significant effect.  The findings fail to support 
the tenets of cultivation theory, but the findings do support the idea that salience of stereotypes is 
correlated to our personal contact with other groups.  As the questions asked for individuals to 
self-report based on a perception that another was Muslim, the findings still provide the basis for 
further studies into acceptance or rejection of stereotypes in relation to personal exposure.  
Prior research found there to be a high level of Islamophobia amongst respondents; 
however, this study found there to be a low acceptance of negative stereotypes of Muslims, the 
Qur’an, or Islam.  All means were below a 4 on a 7-point Likert scale, indicating disagreement 
with negative statements and agreement with positive statements; at the same time, there were a 
few outliers that did fall higher on the scale.  The standard deviations were not high either, 
indicating a cluster of responses around the mean.  While there were outliers, the low standard 
deviation contradicts previous findings (Gonzalez et al., 2008, Boscarino et al., 2006).  
Boscarino et al.’s (2006) respondents reported a high level of fear of a Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) attack; however, the study took place two years after a terrorist attack in 
New York City which could explain for the high levels of fear.  Given the current amount and 
duration of negative coverage in the mass media, it is interesting to see the results of this study.  
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There could be a higher level of Islamophobia abroad as there is a higher level of refugee and 
immigration numbers in Europe and Australia.  However, neither of the previous studies 
examined media consumption in connection with levels of fear; rather, they looked at levels of 
fear in combination with other variables. 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter explored the findings from the study.  The mass media continue to 
perpetuate the myth of the Islamic terrorist, but the findings of the present study suggest that the 
efforts are proving to be for naught.  When intergroup contact is factored in, the effect of the 
media is further diluted.   
Limitations 
There are limitations to the study.  The research was only concerned with consumers of 
U.S. mass media.  The research also relied on self-reported data and correlative analysis.  The 
sample was a convenience sample with limited snow-ball sampling, making generalization 
difficult.  The data collection method through Facebook, Reddit, and the university student 
populace likely limited the diversity in responses.  The majority of the respondents were 
Northern American and had at least a Bachelor’s degree, meaning that the participant pool is not 
reflective of the entire United States’ population.  Ryan and Bauman (2016) report that “in 2015, 
the majority (88%) of adults were at least high school graduates, and more than half (59%) had 
completed some college” (p. 1).  More participants that had only some college or less would 
have made the results more representative of the U.S. average educational level.  Also, it is 
possible that as education attainment increases the more presentation bias could affect results.   
The study relied on a recall of overall hours of media watched during an average week. 
Analysis on how viewing an image would immediately effect a participant’s level of fear of 
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Muslims, the Qur’an, or Islam was not evaluated.  The nature of the study, being done online and 
through self-reporting, could have also resulted in the participant taking time to reflect on their 
answer rather than just responding on their initial thoughts.  The ability to reflect on a response 
rather than just responding based on their initial response to a question could have allowed the 
respondents to adjust their responses to be more positive than is true.  While all scales were 
reliable, it cannot be confirmed that the respondents did not take time to ensure that they were 
answering in a way that was more positive than their true opinions.  
There was no analysis of implicit and explicit bias in relation to Islam and Muslims that 
was measured.  There is the chance that the participants report positive perceptions of Islam 
when they consciously think about their answer, but when faced with quick decisions they fall 
into the pattern of stereotyping an individual that appears to be Muslim as the Other to be feared.  
Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis (2002) state that “implicit measures were designed for use in 
situations in which explicit measures were unlikely to tap bias, correspondence tends to be 
weaker for socially sensitive issues” (p. 578).  Researchers have argued that while it can be 
difficult to identify implicit biases, attempting to account for them can provide valuable insight 
into prejudices held by groups (Gonzalez et al., 2008; Hewstone et al., 2002).  Future research 
could look into measuring implicit and explicit bias and comparing those answers to answers that 
are provided through similar scales to see if there are any significant differences between reports.   
The snowball sampling for this study resulted in a limited range of demographics.  The 
lack of diversity in age and education attainment could have resulted in a skewed sample that 
already had more positive opinions of Islam, Muslims, and the Qur’an.  A more diverse sample 
in terms of age and attained education could provide a stronger analysis of cultivation’s effect on 
higher consumers of mass media.  This study also did not ask for participants to report the 
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religion to which they adhere.  It is possible that there were a number of Muslim respondents and 
this would have skewed results to the more positive end of the spectrum.  Future studies should 
ensure to ask for a participant’s religious identification so as to accommodate for this mediating 
variable.  
The sources of media were limited only to television, movies, and music videos.  Past 
analysis of the mass media included newspapers and news magazines.  This study did not utilize 
print media, but analysis of current print media could provide a different result.  Newspapers and 
news magazines have been routine, but this study focused on mass media that often involves 
moving images. 
Future research could also utilize other forms of analysis of the mass media in order to 
further refine mass-media effects research.  Rhetorical analyses of specific texts—from speeches 
to media texts—can uncover potentially anti-Islamic messages within them.  A discourse 
analysis, looking at naturally occurring conversation in different contexts, could overcome the 
problems of presentation bias and create a clearer analysis of the effects of messages.  An 
experiment that utilizes pre- and post-tests and exposes participants to certain messages could 
also be used to measure the change in perception before and after exposure.  Focus groups could 
be used to discuss multiple interpretations of messages and how individuals respond individually 
and collectively to messages. 
Implications for Practice 
The findings are helpful in creating an understanding that the media may not be as 
influential in our daily perceptions of reality as once thought.  Advertising companies, the 
government, and other sectors of society spend billions of dollars a year investing in the mass 
media.  However, is all of that really producing the results desired?  Groups should not abandon 
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their use of the mass media due to the results of this study, but should evaluate the results they 
are finding with their efforts.  Social media do offer an avenue for positive engagement with 
society.  Briones, Kuch, Liu, and Jin (2011) explain that “social media usage is beneficial for 
nonprofit organizations for several reasons” (p. 38).  Briones et al. found that nonprofit 
organizations have found many ways to engage various individuals and groups to streamline 
many of their functions, increase abilities to create effective relationship building programs, and 
distribute their message to more individuals.  Responsible and effective use of the mass media, 
and specifically social media, can provide a new avenue through which to quickly organize 
groups and distribute information.  Groups could also utilize social media as a way to break 
down stereotypes and promote media literacy programs.  
The results also show that increased contact with groups that are different from ourselves 
is a predictor of reduced acceptance of negative stereotypes of others.  Ensuring that children are 
introduced to as wide an array of cultures and individuals as possible could help reduce 
stereotypes of and prejudice towards certain groups and, thus, violence that is based on 
differences between groups.  Current events suggest that the United States is mired in a struggle 
between ethnicities, whether the individual is Middle Eastern, Black, or Caucasian, tensions are 
running high.  Mapping Police Violence, a research collaborative, (2016) reports that “police are 
killing black people at persistently high rates” (np).  The 2016 presidential election is also seeing 
a large focus on racial tension.  Milligan (2016) explains that “Obama’s election, far from 
making Americans more comfortable with minority leadership, in some ways exacerbated those 
fears” and that “the growth of the Latino population has added to the national angst as well” 
(para 7-8).  The findings indicate that the more varied and positive our contact is with other 
cultures the higher the probability for tensions to decrease between groups.  Programs that are 
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attempting to decrease Islamophobia, and other ethnic divides, could be informed about the study 
and use it as a way to further their goals.  However, just increasing contact will not be enough.  
Programs looking to build more positive relationships between groups should pay attention to the 
conditions outlined in much of the contact theory literature (Pettigrew, 1998; Dovidio, Gaertner, 
& Kawakami, 2003; Tawagi & Mak, 2014; Hewstone, 2015)  Developing programs that aim to 
increase multi-cultural understanding and intergroup contact could help mitigate unreported 
levels of Islamophobia, as well as other ethnic relation issues.  
The study shows that consumption of some media is not the best predictor of a level of 
acceptance of statements about others in a participant.  This means that there is something else, 
or multiple things, that could be the cause of acceptance of stereotypes.  Further research that 
focuses on the United States could compare regions of the United States to see if there are 
differences in geographical regions in regards to levels of fear.  Also, further research could 
compare American and non-American results to see if there is a difference in the cultivation 
effect between countries, and, if there is, what other possible mediating might be.  However, this 
study should not be used to completely discredit cultivation theory.  Today’s media landscape is 
much more diverse than that of 1970, when Gerbner wrote on cultivation.  Individuals consume a 
wider variety of mass media, many of which could not have been predicted by Gerbner, meaning 
that the theory needs alterations and not just abandonment. 
In conclusion, while this study does have limitations, the results suggest that the mass 
media’s ability to cultivate reality may not be as strong as Gerbner (2002) predicted.  Previous 
research points to the cultivation effect being strong in relation to crime and fear of Black 
Americans, but there is no correlation for Islamophobia.  There is plenty of ground for future 
research to continue exploring Islamophobia.  Delving further into intergroup contact’s ability to 
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counter negative stereotypes could provide needed research on how to continue to mitigate 
negative messages about perceived outgroups.  Programs that work to increase intergroup 
connectedness could use this study to aid in creating initiatives that are focused on raising 
awareness of various cultures and encouraging interconnectedness amongst multiple different 
cultures. 
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